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Aronofsky: Voters Wisely Reject Proposed Constitutional Amendment

VOTERS WISELY REJECT PROPOSED
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 30 TO
ELIMINATE THE MONTANA BOARD OF REGENTS
David Aronofsky, J.D., Ph.D."
I. INTRODUCTION

On November 5, 1996, Montana voters made perhaps the
most significant higher education policy decision in the state's
history by resoundingly rejecting proposed Constitutional
Amendment 30 (C-30) to eliminate the Montana Board of Regents.1 C-30 would have replaced the constitutionally autonomous Regents with a much weaker Education Commission directed by a gubernatorial employee and having powers set solely
by the Montana Legislature. C-30 raised the specter of Montana
history repeating itself by returning to the same type of failed
governance structure rejected by Montana's 1972 constitutional
framers. By rejecting C-30, the voters in 1996 reaffirmed the
mission of Montana voters who created the Board in Montana's
1972 Constitution as a buffer against this historical past.2 These
1972 founders spurned more than 80 prior years of weak, ineffective leadership caused by the predecessor governing board's lack
* The University of Montana Legal Counsel and an adjunct faculty member in
the Schools of Law and Education, acknowledges important contributions made by
1996 University of Montana Law School graduates Tamara Barkus, Dan Cahalan,
and especially Todd Stubbs, whose collective academic interests in this subject notably enhanced this article's research and analytical depth. Views in this article are
the author's, and not intended to reflect any University of Montana or Montana
University System position.
1. 242,146 people (63 percent) voted against C-30, while 142,224 people (37
percent) voted for it. Montana Secretary of State Official 1996 Election Results (visited May 7, 1997) <http//www.mt.gov/sos/election.htm> (on file with the Montana Law
Review).
2. The 1972 Montana Constitution expressly provides: 'The government and
control of the Montana university system is vested in a board of regents of higher
education which shall have full power, responsibility and authority to supervise, coordinate, manage and control the Montana university system ... . The board consists
of seven members appointed by the governor and confirmed by the senate, to overlapping terms, as provided by law. The governor and superintendent of public instruction are ex officio non-voting members of the board." MoNT. CONST. art. X, § 9,
cl. (2Xa), (b). Montana Code section 2-15-1508 grants the regents seven year terms
except for a full-time Montana public campus student, whose term shall be 1-4 years.
This Code section also provides that no two regents may be from the same state redistricting commission district as defined in Montana Code section 5-1-102; and that
no more than four regents may be members of the same political party. Subsection
2-15-1508(3) of the Montana Code excepts the student regent from these geographic
and political party restrictions.
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of viable legal authority or structure and effectively insulated
public campuses from Montana political officials in lieu of giving
these political officials more direct control over public campuses.
This lack of viable authority or structure contributed to
Montana's well documented history of having one of the most politically controversial and poorest quality public higher education
systems in the United States.
Of course there was no assurance that the history of the
regressive pre-1972 era would be repeated merely by elimination
of the Regents as a constitutionally autonomous governing body.
Moreover, neither sound policy nor top quality higher education
in fact necessarily require constitutionally autonomous governing
boards. Well over half of the states in the country rely on legislatures rather than constitutions to define public campus governing board powers and there is no apparent harm to campuses or
to the public. Nonetheless, Montana voters chose not to risk the
governance system they had placed in the Constitution in 1972.
C-30 approval would have made Montana the first state to
ever abolish a constitutional higher education governing board.
This in turn would likely have generated controversies over
several critical issues which received little attention in Montana
during the C-30 debate. These critical issues include accreditation, academic quality, stability, the costs of any change, and the
legal nature of any post-approval system.
Although the voters effectively killed C-30 at the polls in
November, there are currently two new attacks to Montana's
Board of Regents and its constitutional powers. The first attack
comes from legislators who led efforts to get C-30 on the ballot
with the objective of abolishing the Regents.3 The second attack
comes from the Montana Board of Land Commissioners, five
state elected officials who have embroiled the Regents in a constitutional crisis now pending in the Montana Supreme Court
over Regents powers to transact Montana University System
property.4 These attacks evidence the ongoing desire to elimi-

3. See discussion infra part VIII.A.
4. Compare MONT. CONST. art. X, § 4 ("The governor, superintendent of public
instruction, auditor, secretary of state, and attorney general constitute the board of
land commissioners. It has the authority to direct, control, lease, exchange, and
sell . . . lands which have been or may be granted for the support and benefit of the
various state educational institutions, under such regulations and restrictions as may
be provided by law.") with MONT. CONST. art. X, § 9, cl. 2(a) ("The government and
control of the Montana university system is vested in a board of regents of higher
education which shall have full power, responsibility, and authority to supervise,
coordinate, manage and control the Montana university system . . . "). See discussion
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nate or weaken the Regent's constitutional authority in Montana. Clearly, this issue was not fully resolved last November
and warrants further examination to benefit future discussion.
This article seeks to identify and assess the more significant
legal and related policy issues surrounding public higher education governance in general, as well as Montana's public higher
education governance in particular, with special emphasis on C30 in the United States higher education and Montana historical
contexts. Part II of this article presents a legal and historical
profile of the United States public higher education governance
systems. This profile shows how Montana, both currently and as
C-30 proposed, would have radically departed from all other
state public university governance systems. Part III describes
Montana's public higher education governance history both before and since the Board of Regents was created in 1972. This
review of history illustrates why Montana's pre-1972 past made
C-30 particularly ill-advised and describes the genesis of C-30.
The article next explores, in Part IV, the primary arguments
utilized to support or oppose United States public governing
boards' legal autonomy. Part V assesses how governing boards
without such autonomy subject a state's public universities to
significant accreditation, academic quality and legal instability
problems. Part VI describes higher education restructuring efforts in other states not considered in the C-30 debate, and suggests that C-30's fiscal costs could well have exceeded its benefits
had the amendment received voter approval. Part VI also suggests how current Montana law, with relatively few amendments, might avoid some of the problems inherent in eliminating
the Board of Regents should C-30 re-emerge. Part VII identifies
the legislative and Land Board attacks on the present Regent's
autonomy and suggests that the C-30 controversy may be far
from over. Finally, based on review of these issues applicable to
Montana public higher education, Part VIII concludes that Montana voters made the right decision last November in defeating
C-30 and maintaining a constitutionally autonomous 5 Montana

infra part VIII.B.
5. For purposes of this article, the term "constitutional autonomy" refers to
exclusive management and control of a state's public higher education system (or in
some cases individual institutions) by a governing board created in express constitutional language as recognized by a state's highest court.
A definition originally developed in Joseph C. Beckham, Constitutional Autonomy: Legal Implications for the State University System of Florida v (1977) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Florida) (on file with author) [hereinafter
Beckham Dissertation]. Dr. Beckham, a Professor of Higher Education at Florida
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Board of Regents.
II. UNITED STATES PUBLIC HIGHER EDUCATION GOVERNANCE
AND AUTONOMY: A LEGAL AND HISTORICAL PROFILE
Meaningful C-30 analysis requires understanding United
States public higher education governance structures, as well as

the historical context in which such structures were created.
A. United States Public HigherEducation Boards:A Legal
Profile
Although each state makes its own laws which create its
own unique public higher education system governance structures, three general types of legal structures (organized into
three groups of states) have emerged over the years to characterize state system governance.' The first state group includes
Montana and uses a legal model with a single statewide board
responsible for governing most or all public degree-granting campuses. (This is the model now educating over 70 percent of all
United States college students). These governing boards differ
from state coordinating boards found in the minority of states.8
Classifying public higher education systems according to
their legal status has proved difficult because each state's highest court tends to construe its own state constitution and statutory provisions applicable to governance without regard to comparable constitutional and statutory governance language in other
states.' However, different methods have been developed to clas-

State University, is also an experienced attorney whose works in this field have been
cited by every subsequent study.
6. The most recent EDUCATION COMMISSION OF THE STATES (ECS)
POSTSECONDARY EDUCATION

STRUCTURES HANDBOOK (1994) [hereinafter

HANDBOOK]

describes all the U.S. legal public higher education governance structures, noting: "All
states assign responsibility for the operation of public colleges and universities to
governing boards usually named either Boards of Trustees or Boards of Regents." See
HANDBOOK, supra at 3 and Section C. ECS is a nonprofit, nationwide interstate compact formed in 1965 by all 50 states plus the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the
U.S. Virgin Islands and American Samoa "to help governors, state legislators, state
education officials and others develop policies to improve the quality of education at
all levels." Id. at ii.
7. See id. at 3.
8. State coordinating boards have limited decision-making authority over campus and system personnel or budget activities; although a discernible number of
states follow Montana's approach by combining governance and coordination responsibilities into a single board. See id.
9. For example, although 35 states have constitutions creating or authorizing
creation of public systems, institutions and/or governing boards, only 14 of these
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sify these. Dr. Beckham classifies states into two groups: those
where a state's constitutional language grants broad autonomy
powers which might or might not have been limited by judicial
action; and those where the state constitutional language grants
its legislature a limited governance role which has been restricted by court decision in favor of board autonomy."l The Education Commission of the States (ECS) classifies groups based on
whether all public campuses in a given state are placed under a
single constitutionally created governing board; and also on
whether a constitution expressly allows legislative involvement."
A second, larger state group has public higher education
systems, institutions and/or governing boards cited in its
members' respective constitutions; but these states expressly give
their respective legislatures "substantial power to oversee operation and management of' public higher education. 2 As Dr.
Beckham notes, "the constitutional status of public higher education in these states does not suggest a high degree of autonomy.
Likewise, judicial decisions in these states have not confirmed

states have boards with a level of constitutional autonomy as defined by Dr.
Beckham.
10. Dr. Beckham lists Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, North Dakota, Oklahoma and Utah as states with broad constitutional autonomy language not authorizing legislative involvement in governance even
though Missouri's and Utah's courts have somewhat limited their respective boards'
autonomy. See Joseph Beckham, Reasonable Independence for Public Higher Education: Legal Implications of Constitutionally Autonomous Status, 7 J.L. & EDUC. 177,
179-80 (1978) [hereinafter Beckham, Reasonable Independence]. He then lists California, Idaho, Nevada and South Dakota as constitutionally autonomous board states
with varying degrees of legislative activity authorized in their boards' respective
constitutional creation language. See id. at 180.
11. This results in a list of 14 states somewhat different from Dr. Beckham's.
See HANDBOOK, supra note 6, § C at 89. This list, which includes Arkansas, California, Colorado, Georgia, Kansas, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota and Oklahoma, is based less on autonomy
than on actual legal structure language in each state's constitution. Note that Montana is on both lists.
12. Beckham, Reasonable Independence, supra note 10, at 180. Although Dr.
Beckham only lists and discusses some of these states, they probably include Alaska,
Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Hawaii, Kansas, Mississippi, Nebraska, New
Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Texas, Washington, Wisconsin and Wyoming since
their respective constitutions all expressly authorize public governing boards subject
to the general powers of their legislatures. See also Sylvia R. Reynolds, The Autonomy of the Arizona Board of Regents Under the State Constitution 46-52 (1992) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Arizona State University) (on file with author). Pennsylvania and Virginia might also be included in this list to the extent their respective constitutions specify some higher education board governance powers subject to
legislative control.

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1997

5

338

Montana Law Review, Vol. 58 [1997], Iss. 2, Art. 2

MONTANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58

broad constitutional autonomy for the higher education system." 3 A typical state in this group is New Mexico, which constitutionally requires that the "legislature shall provide for the
control and management" of each public higher education institution "by a board of regents."" Finally, a third state group
roughly the size of the full constitutional autonomy group defines
its members' public higher education governance systems solely
by statute without any constitutional reference. For the level of
autonomy needed to function effectively and avert the problems
discussed more fully below, these statutorily created boards rely
on "sources other than the state constitution, including the enactment of corporate status, special statutes exempting them
from general state legislation, their academic tradition, and the
normal amount of administrative discretion permitted most statutory agencies. " "
As indicated above, because the 1972 Montana Constitution
created the Board of Regents based on Michigan's autonomy
model-a model which placed Michigan within the group of
states that has the fullest constitutional autonomy-Montana
falls within this first group of states as well. 6 The status of

13. Beckham, Reasonable Independence, supra note 10, at 180.
14. N.M. CONST. art. XII, § 13. This is similar to language in C-30, which
would have replaced the Montana Board of Regents with a "State Education Commission" to have "duties as assigned by law." See ch. 156, 1995 Mont. Laws 442.
15. Reynolds, supra note 12, at 50. These states include Connecticut, Delaware,
Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont and West Virginia.
Dr. Reynolds notes that those boards
with statutory status are continuously subjected to legislative . . . prerogatives. [A number of state court decisions] "support the principle that constitutional status provides the university system greater autonomy over
those ... legislatively created. Thus, higher education leaders prefer ...
constitutional status because it generally provides ... greater security and
places them in a better legal position to negotiate with the legislative and
executive branches. In contrast, statutory governing boards are treated as
state agencies, or state departments, and can operate only within the legal
framework defined by the legislature ...
the statutory university system
can be forced to comply with state government ...
planning, budgeting,
coordination, construction, auditing, personnel, and the deposit of funds with
the state treasurer. The legislature can also pass laws affecting its affairs,
subject only to the constraints imposed by the state and the federal constitutions and federal law, such as those relating to speech, assembly, academic freedom and press.
Id. at 48-49.
16. Michigan, generally viewed as the most autonomous public higher education
state in the United States, has long headed this list of states having the fullest
constitutional autonomy. Montana's place on the list is far from coincidental, since
the 1972 Montana Constitutional Convention delegates conscientiously chose Michigan
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Montana's Board is explained below in an examination of the
histories of both Michigan's and Montana's paths to autonomy,
which in turn parallel an overall inclination towards lay governing board independence from politicians in American public education.
B. United States PublicHigher Education Governance:A Brief
History
Religious groups created and directed America's first colleges
and universities that emerged during the seventeenth century
colonial period and dominated United States higher education
through the mid-nineteenth century. 7 Although these religiously affiliated schools received heavy public subsidies from both
colonial legislative bodies and the British Crown, the school
governing boards zealously guarded their autonomy to set all
campus policies. This tradition of freedom from political interference continued into early post-colonial America and helped contribute to the first higher education board autonomy case ever to
reach the United States Supreme Court.
Dartmouth College v. Woodward' rejected an attempt by
the New Hampshire Legislature to create a state overseer board
to assist the college board of trustees with campus governance.
Daniel Webster represented Dartmouth and argued that legislation which impaired Dartmouth's original charter violated the
United States Constitutional protection of a contractual right to
independence. Chief Justice Marshall agreed in the Court's majority opinion, which strongly favored autonomy for all colleges."9 Justice Marshall's concern for autonomy was not limited to
as the autonomy model they wished to emulate.
17.
See Beckham Dissertation, supra note 5, at 13-21. For example, Puritans
founded Harvard in 1636 and Yale in 1702; Anglicans founded William and Mary in
1693; and during 18th Century Colonial America, Presbyterians founded Princeton;
Episcopalians founded Columbia; Baptists founded Brown; Reformists founded Rutgers
(which later became public); and Congregationalists founded Dartmouth.
18.
17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 518 (1819).
19. Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. at 598. Chief Justice Marshall stated:
They [America's colonial colleges] have flourished hitherto, and have become
in a high degree respectable and useful to the community ....
It will be a
dangerous, a most dangerous, experiment to hold these institutions subject
to the rise and fall of popular parties, and the fluctuations of political opinions . . . . Benefactors will have no certainty .. . of their bounty; and
learned men will be deterred from devoting themselves to the service of
such institutions, from the precarious title of their offices. Colleges and
halls will be deserted by all better spirits, and become a [theater] for the
contention of politics; party and faction will be cherished in the places con-
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private colleges. He drew heavily upon an earlier state court
autonomy decision involving the University of North Carolina. 0
This early nineteenth century case relied on by the Court in
Woodward favored public campus autonomy-autonomy which
was manifested in the first United State public university, the
University of Virginia. The University of Virginia was founded
by Thomas Jefferson with a secular purpose and an intent of
receiving heavy public financing from the legislature. Despite the
fact that Jefferson was one of America's strongest legislative
democracy advocates (and no political ally of Justice Marshall),
he intended the University Board of Visitors to have "all powers
which had been customarily exercised by incorporated boards" of
colonial and early post-colonial private colleges and universities.2 ' Most so-called "public" campuses during this period were
publicly chartered by state legislatures and received large sums
of public funds from various sources, including special taxes,
appropriations, tolls and even special lotteries. However, the governing bodies of these campuses functioned like private corporate
boards free from political intrusion.2 2 This principle, that higher
education should be free from political intrusion, served as a
common conceptual reference point for early American leaders
such as Jefferson, Webster and Marshall.

secrated to piety and learning.
Id.
20. See Trustees of the Univ. of North Carolina v. Fry, 5 N.C. 57 (1805). The
case involved a similar attack by one of America's first public university governing
boards against state legislation attempting to repeal a law guaranteeing escheat
property transfers to the University. In favoring the University, North Carolina's
Supreme Court cited the state constitution requiring that "all useful learning . . . be
encouraged in one or more universities" to declare the University of North Carolina
"agents of the people . . . over which the power of the Legislature ceased." Id. at 62.
It should be noted this case was later overturned in University of North Carolina v.
Maultsby, 43 N.C. 257 (1852).
21. J.S. BRUBACHER & W. RUDY, HIGHER EDUCATION IN TRANSITION: A HISTORY
OF AMERICAN COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES, 1936-1976, at 147-49 (3d ed. 1976).
22. See id. at 35-36, 145-46. As Dr. Delgado notes, autonomous lay boards have
deep American roots:
From the founding of the earliest American colleges, the public interest in
higher education has been personified in both independent and public institutions by the lay board of trustees. A common defense of boards is that
they protect the broadly defined public interest by simultaneously shielding
the institution from shortsighted external influences and ensuring that parochial interests are not served at the expense of essential societal needs.
Rosa A. Cintron Delgado, History of the Inclusion of the Governing Board Concept as
a Requisite for Accreditation in the Commission on Colleges, Southern Association of
Colleges and Schools: Implications for Policy Formulation 43-44 (1992) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, Florida State University) (on file with author).
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American distrust of political control over United States
higher education continued well into the nineteenth century. The
University of Michigan, hailed as "the most complete embodiment of the Jeffersonian ideal of higher education in the pioneer
West" and also as "instrumental in defining the role of the [modem] state university," received autonomy from the Michigan
Legislature to reverse decades of unhealthy political meddling.23
To remedy the excesses of legislative interference, the 1852
Michigan Constitution Convention proposed granting the University of Michigan Board of Regents "the general supervision of the
University and direction and control of all expenditures from the
University Interest Fund."24 In doing so, the Michigan Supreme
Court found that Michigan's citizens directed the court to place
these universities "beyond mere political influences" in entrusting them to the governing boards.25 The Michigan Supreme
Court has staunchly defended Michigan's public university board
autonomy from legislative and executive branch encroachment
ever since. It perhaps warrants mention here that Michigan's
Constitution calls for popular election of that state's public university governing board members as an additional means of
insulating these boards from legislators and executive branch
23.
See Beckham Dissertation, supra note 5, at 24-25 (other citations omitted).
The argument by which legislatures have hitherto convinced themselves that
it was their duty to legislate universities to death is this: "It is a state
institution, and we are the direct representatives of the people, and therefore it is expected of us; it is our right. The people have an interest in this
thing and we must attend to it." As if because a University belongs to the
people, that were reason why it should be dosed to death for fear it would
be sick if left to be nursed, like other institutions, by its immediate guard-

ians. Thus has state after state, in this American Union, endowed universities and then by repeated contradictory and overlegislation, torn them to
pieces with the same facility as they do the statute book, and for the same
reason, because they have the right.
ld. 26-27 (quoting Mich. H.R. Documents of 1840, at 470).
24. See id. at 27, (citing 1850 MICH. CONST. art. XIII, § 8). University of Michigan President Henry Tappan, among the country's leading public higher education
leaders of his day, hailed his state's constitutional autonomy gift by describing its
importance in the creation of a top quality public university:
The University as an institution of the State, open to all the people of the
State, and affording to them the means of the highest education, is a symbol of the essential union of all religious sects, and of all political parties ....
Whatever may be our differences, we have a common agreement-a common interest in the great subject of education. It is part of
wisdom to preserve the University intact from the questions on which we
differ, and to maintain and foster it purely as an educational institution.
Id. at 25 (quoting Henry Tappan).
25. See Sterling v. Regents of the Univ. of Mich., 68 N.W. 253, 254 (Mich.
1896).
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officials. However, a number of other states2" adopted the Michigan constitutional autonomy model (without board member elections) by the end of the nineteenth century "to remove questions
of management, control and supervision of the universities from
the reach of politicians in state legislatures and governors'
offices."27 Many of the country's great public higher education
systems and institutions of the nineteenth century took deliberate constitutional paths to political and legal autonomy in order
to obtain the quality they were seeking. United States higher
education in general, and public higher education in particular,
grew heavily in the last half of that century. This growth followed both the 1862 Morrill Act which was passed by Congress
to create federally supported land grant colleges, and the many
state laws which earmarked state property taxes to fund these
colleges.2"

26. This list includes Nevada, Missouri, Colorado, Idaho, South Dakota, Alabama, Minnesota, California, Utah and Oklahoma. See Beckham Dissertation, supra
note 5, at 28.
Minnesota's Supreme Court emphatically lauded its state's constitutional mandate "to put the management of the greatest state educational institution beyond the
dangers of vacillating policy, ill-formed or careless meddling and partisan ambition
that would be possible in the case of management by either [the] legislature or the
executive" branches of government. State ex rel. University of Minn. v. Chase, 220
N.W. 951, 957 (Minn. 1928) (cited favorably in Regents of Univ. of Minn. v. Lord,
257 N.W. 2d 796, 800 (Minn. 1977)).
27. See Beckham Dissertation, supra note 5, at 28 (citations omitted). Dr.
Eykamp explains why California chose Michigan's autonomy model: "Early experience
with the University of California . . . indicates that when the legal definition of the
University and the authority of its governing board depended on statute law, universities had difficulty attracting and keeping faculty and administrators." Paul W.
Eykamp, Political Control of State Research Universities: The Effect of the Structure
of Political Control on University Quality and Budget 58 (1995) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, University of California at San Diego) (on file with author) (emphasizing
difficulties in finding University of California Presidents before the Regents were
created as part of California's Constitution in 1876, a phenomenon subsequently seen
a number of different times in Montana before 1972). Dr. Reynolds explained the
basis for this U.S. mood of the times:
[I]n the middle of the Nineteenth Century there was pervasive public opinion that higher education should be removed from the day-to-day machinations of the state capital, and protected from religious and political pressures because the state university was conceived to be unique in its goals
and characteristics. The belief was that when either bureaucracy or partisanship infringed upon the authority of the governing board, both the
intellectual and institutional independence of the [campuses] were threatened.
Reynolds, supra note 12, at 5 (citations omitted).
28. See Beckham Dissertation, supra note 5, at 23 (citing overall U.S. campus
enrollment in 1870 as 67,350; 156,756 in 1890; and 355,215 in 1910, with growth
primarily in the public sector).
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Public higher education growth surged even more during the
twentieth century and strong central state governments also
grew to oversee the provisions of new state social services. 9
State government management centralization slowed the trend
towards public higher education governing board autonomy. This
slowing occurred as states opted for more direct control over
campus activities at the same time that public expenditures for
higher education shrunk between 1910 and 1964.0 Although a
discernible number of states bucked this trend and created constitutionally autonomous (or in some cases, more autonomous)
boards, this often came in response to excessive political meddling. Such meddling, in turn, triggered the ousting of incumbent
governors and creation of major accreditation crises."' The majority of states chose systems that provided more board political
control.
The trend towards less state campus and system autonomy
did not go unnoticed in Washington, D.C. Deep national security
concerns about Soviet threats to peace following the 1957 Soviet
Sputnik launch forced a national level assessment of how United
States public higher education could help combat these fears. In
1959 the Eisenhower Committee, headed by President
Eisenhower's brother Milton, was created to study this issue in
depth. The committee of experts, whose work significantly influenced Montana's 1972 Constitution, attacked state encroachment
in public university autonomy as a major problem area for the
country. Based on the Committee's finding that "intervention of
state agencies into ostensibly nonacademic areas can quickly
penetrate to educational policy," the Committee concluded that
"[p]rotecting the authority of lay governing boards from interference by state agencies was vital to the preservation of intellectual freedom." 2

29.
30.
31.

See id. at 36.
See id. at 35-36
See, e.g., discussion infra part VI.A.2.
Alaska and Hawaii, the newest U.S. states, appeared to model their systems
after the ones perceived to be among the nation's strongest, such as Michigan and
California (although whether they succeeded may be debated). See Beckham Dissertation, supra note 5, at 38 (listing North Dakota, Louisiana, Mississippi, Georgia, Hawaii, Alaska and Montana as the states creating or increasing constitutionally autonomous boards between 1930 and 1972).
32.
See id. at 37 (citing COMMIrTEE ON GOVERNMENT AND HIGHER EDUCATION,
THE EFFICIENCY OF FREEDOM 6-7 (1959) (emphasis added) [hereinafter THE EFFICIENCY OF FREEDOM]. A companion study published concurrently with the Committee
findings sharply criticized the "debilitating impact of state administrative controls" on
public higher education and

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1997

11

344

Montana
Law Review,
Vol. REVIEW
58 [1997], Iss. 2, Art. 2
MONTANA
LAW

[Vol. 58

The work of the Eisenhower Committee had its intended
effect of forcing states to rethink their public higher education
governance systems with an eye towards addressing committee
efficiency and autonomy issues. By the early 1970s, most states
addressed concerns with inefficiency by consolidating their respective governance systems into fewer governing boards." Facilitating this consolidation were two Carnegie Commission
Higher Education Reports which urged state governments to diminish "the indirect controls exercised by centralized purchasing,
state civil service, and budgetary or comptrolling agencies" because they caused needless "encroachments upon the traditional
independence of the higher education system."' The Commission deemed "reasonable independence from state government a
priority issue for American higher education." It advocated that
"higher education should be substantially self-governing in its
administrative arrangements, academic affairs, and intellectual
conduct."" Most states were all too willing to oblige. 6
States which had drifted away from autonomy over the years
seemingly corrected their course and opted for public higher
education systems more like the one Montana voters created in
1972 and kept in 1996. These other states did so either by constitutional reform, or by statutorily ensuring full board indepenfurther underscored the need for safeguards to protect the independence of
the college and university. . . . However petty each instance of control may
be, in cumulative effect a broad range of restrictions upon the operating
freedom of institutions of higher education leaves very little room for imagination and vitality by which truly creative institutions of higher learning
are nourished.
Id. at 38 (citing M. MOOS & F. ROURKE, THE CAMPUS AND THE STATE 323 (1959)).
33. See Richard J. Novak, Methods, Objectives, and Consequences of Restructuring, in RESTRUCTURING HIGHER EDUCATION: WHAT WORKS AND WHAT DOESN'T IN
REORGANIZING GOVERNANCE SYSTEMS 20 (Terrence J. MacTaggart & Assocs., ed.
1996) [hereinafter RESTRUCTURING HIGHER EDUCATION].
34. Beckham Dissertation, supra note 5, at 41 (citing CARNEGIE COMMISSION ON
HIGHER EDUCATION, THE CAPITOL AND THE CAMPUS 100 (1971)).
35. Id. at 42 (citing CARNEGIE COMMISSION ON HIGHER EDUCATION, GOVERNANCE OF HIGHER EDUCATION: SIX PRIORITY PROBLEMS 19 (1973) [hereinafter CARNEGIE COMMISSION]).
36. Novak, supra note 33, at 20 ("In many states undergoing consolidation,
state lawmakers also wanted to put some political distance between themselves and
higher education. Many clearly felt the need for objective professional advice to help
them make decisions or to free them from having to make politically difficult choices.")
In studying public higher education governance trends and developments
throughout the U.S., ECS found that 12 states strengthened their state boards during the 1970's; another 10 did so in the 1980's; and only one state, West Virginia,
weakened its Board of Regents by abolishing that entity and dividing its powers into
two newly created successors. HANDBOOK, supra note 6, at 23-28.
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dence.37
C. State Education Department Heads With Higher Education
Governance Responsibility:A Nonexistent Model in the United
States
C-30 approval would have taken Montana in a direction
contrary to nearly the rest of the country, likely raising many
issues already addressed and effectively resolved in other states.
It would also have taken Montana back to a history which Montana voters spurned for good reason, as seen below. C-30 partly
contemplated an education commission model not too different
from higher education governance structures in many other
states which define governing board powers by statute. However,
it also proposed another element which deviated substantially
from any other United States governance model: a
gubernatorially appointed and controlled Education Department
Director who serves as Commission President. No other state
has a model which combines a public board with legal governance powers," with a gubernatorial cabinet member likely to
have public campus governance authority.
Although a handful of states including Colorado, Maryland,
New Jersey, Oregon and Pennsylvania have gubernatorially
appointed officials who direct state higher education coordinating
boards, none of these boards has any campus governance powers.
Moreover, all but one of these states have multiple governing
boards to oversee their respective public campuses and systems.39 The governing boards in these five states and every other state governing board in the country, including states like
37. For example, New Jersey's 1994 higher education reform abolished that
state's Higher Education Department (a traditional government agency like the State
Education Department proposed in C-30); replaced its state Higher Education Board,
a coordinating entity, with a smaller Higher Education Commission having similar
coordinating functions; and perhaps most importantly, increased the legal autonomy
of that state's public campus governing boards over virtually all their own key decisions. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A.3B-1 (West 1995); Patricia Alex, Smaller
Government's Casualties Higher Ed Board: Verdict is Still Out, REC. N. N.J., July 2,
1995, at 001. These changes appear to differ substantially from how C-30 proponents
have recently described them in C-30 debates, since proponents cite New Jersey's
changes as evidence of more legislative accountability; while Governor Whitman and
the legislature made clear in the restructuring law that increased legal autonomy for
the campuses was a key reason for passing it.
38. These powers are required for university accreditation.
39. Oregon does not have a multiple governing board to oversee their respective
public campuses and systems because its state higher education board appoints its
own chief executive officer.
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Montana which combine coordination and governance into one
board, hire their own chief executive officers." Whether the
Education Commission proposed in C-30 would have received the
power to hire their own officers is far from clear. This uncertainty, given a lack of any comparable state model, raises questions
about whether C-30 approval would have triggered needless legal
instability and uncertainty for Montana's public universities. It
also hearkens back into Montana history when uncertainty about
state board executive officer power plagued the state for many
years.
III. MONTANA PUBLIC HIGHER EDUCATION GOVERNANCE
BEFORE AND SINCE 1972: SOME HISTORY LESSONS WELL WORTH
LEARNING

Montana's public higher education history before 1972 was
by most accounts a marked failure, characterized by: (1) a weak
state governing board charged with overseeing both higher and
elementary-secondary education, with few resources to do this
effectively; (2) decades of repression against some of Montana's
ablest university faculty members, resulting in blacklisting by
the most prestigious academic organization in the country; (3)
chronic public university underfunding by the Montana Legislature, exacerbated by the state's poor public higher education
reputation and compounded by few non-state donors or dollars
needed to supplement meager state support; and (4) a lack of
confidence in the public education system, re-enforced by an inability of campuses to recruit talented faculty and administrators
to work in the state because of these problems." By the time
the 1972 Constitutional Convention was called, most Montanans
were clamoring for change and strong public higher education
leadership. By 1996, twenty-four years after the marked changes
in the Constitution, Montanans evidenced faith in the Board of
Regents' autonomy by rejecting C-30.
A. Montana Governance History Before 1972
1. Territorial and Early Statehood Days: Montana's First
Campuses and State Board of Education, 1885-1911
Montana public higher education governance history began

40.
41.

See HANDBOOK, supra note 6, especially Section A.
See discussion infra part IV.A.
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with high hopes and expectations even before Montana became a
state or had its first campus. Territory leaders of 1884 drafted a
proposed state constitution which created a Board of Regents,
apparently modeled after California's successful model adopted
some ten years earlier. The Board of Regents had general supervision of a University of Montana. 42 The United States Congress
approved the proposed 1885 Constitution as a prerequisite for
statehood; but the 1889 Montana Constitutional Convention
rejected the Board of Regents and created a State Board of Education responsible for all Montana public education.' The main
justification for this change appears to have been a concern that
too many "technical and other schools" would encroach on each
other if the Constitution allowed multiple boards."
The 1889 Constitution placed the Governor on the Board,
thereby assuring direct executive branch oversight of higher
education. The framers also made the Board dependent upon the
legislature as the sole source of authority by requiring that all
Board "powers and duties shall be prescribed and regulated by
law."' This legal structure remained essentially unchanged
until 1972.
Montana's 1893 Legislature gave the Board various statutory powers to oversee universities, elementary and secondary
schools; and even authorized establishment of various public
campuses in Bozeman and Missoula, as well as a teacher training campus in Dillon and a school of mines in Butte.4 The campuses in Dillon and Butte proved a perennial source of controversy even before they opened due to concerns that the state could
not fund them and doubts about whether the Dillon location
could attract sufficient enrollment.47 However, the Board lacked
the power to address these concerns. In addition, the Board's

42. See Edward B. Chenette, The Montana State Board of Education: A Study
of Higher Education in Conflict, 1884-1959 23-24 (1972) (unpublished Ed.D. dissertation, University of Montana) (on file with the University of Montana Library). This
1885 language bore close similarity to the language approved 87 years later in 1972.
Id. at 25.
43. See id. at 24, 29-31.
44. Id, at 30.
45. MONT. CONST. art. XI, § 11 (1889). See also Hugh V. Schaefer, The Legal
Status of the Montana University System Under the New Montana Constitution, 35
MONT. L. REv. 189 (1974). The Board, "although a constitutional entity, nevertheless
was completely dependent upon the legislature for its powers and duties . . . Until
the legislature passed laws which implemented the constitutional mandate, the board
was virtually powerless." Id. at 191.
46. See Chenette, supra note 42, at 50-58.
47. See id. at 48-49, 65.
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scope of power in other key areas such as authority to receive
and spend state funds on the campuses was in doubt.'
Montana higher education had mixed success in the 1893
Legislature, which followed a pattern it would repeat for many
years: appropriating funds well in excess of what could be legally
spent under the Constitution. This forced the State Board of
Examiners (composed of the Governor, Attorney General and
Secretary of State) to freeze the excess appropriations.4 9 Only
Bozeman could open for classes because it had already received
federal Morrill Act funds as Montana's land grant campus. 0
However, the other three campuses also ultimately opened and
Montana's public higher education system was born.5
Auspiciously, in 1895 and 1896, the Board's new problems
began with spending authority and academic personnel. The
Board had to sue Montana's State Treasurer to force a $10,000
payment for the Bozeman campus when the Treasurer refused to
52
release the funds despite a legislative mandate to do so. Although the Board won the case, this neither clarified Board powers in subsequent similar disputes nor endeared the Board to
other state officials.
The Board also faced a major academic personnel crisis
when the Bozeman Local Executive Board (created by statute to
oversee local campus affairs, without clear direction on how to
answer to the State Board) demanded resignations of the President and a dozen faculty members for no apparent reason.'
The Local Board chose to dismiss three of the faculty members
and the State Board upheld the Local Board's action with little
explanation.' Dr. Chenette, one of Montana's leading higher
education historians, noted:
Unfortunately for higher education in Montana, the arbitrary
dismissal of the three professors was not an isolated incident.
For with their decision in 1896 to sustain the local executive
board... the State Board of Education was embarking on a
forty-five year spree of star chamber proceedings, book-burnings, suppression of academic freedom and the firing, without
hearings, of both professors and presidents. Four times in the

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See

id.
id.
id.
id.
id.
id.
id.

at 65.

at
at
at
at

64-66.
90-91.
93-94.
94-96.
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years to come the action of the State Board of Education would
cause an institution of higher learning in Montana to be investigated and blacklisted by the [AAUP].'
He also notes, however, that these problems likely occurred, in
part, because of Montana's history of labor strife and bitter political partisanship.5 6 These problems somewhat paralleled what
was happening on campuses in other states.57
The last several years of the nineteenth century saw continued Board fiscal woes and personnel controversies effecting the
campuses. The university had little ability to resolve the fiscal
problems, "forced as it was to rely heavily upon legislative appropriations" which made campuses "too vulnerable to the prevailing political whims of the legislature. There was nothing to ensure a reasonable continuity in appropriations by the legislative
body from biennium to biennium."58 The state was so poor financially that the School of Mines, authorized in 1893 legislation, could not open until 1898, and the Bozeman campus faced
serious financial problems when the state withheld payments of
various funds.59 The Board also adopted a controversial 1898
rule which did the following: (1) barred all outside faculty work
absent presidential approval and all outside faculty work "which
might impair ... effectiveness;" (2) required full reimbursement
to the state for all costs resulting from faculty outside work, even
if approved; and (3) required payment of all outside faculty work
income to the school.' The cumbersome provisions of this rule
cost University of Montana Professor Elrod an important federal
grant to study Montana's water, and almost cost him his faculty
position when the Board criticized Professor Elrod's attempt to
communicate his objection to the rule directly to the Board
rather than through the University President.6 The Board had
to relax the rule some years later when the schools had difficulty
attracting good quality faculty because of low salaries; and when
the board learned that University of Montana law faculty were
among the lowest paid in the nation, and thus harming the law
school's reputation. 2

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id.
See
See
Id.
See

at 96.
id.
id.
at 109.
id. at 109-10, 113-15.
Id. at 117-18.
See id. at 128.
See id. at 133-34, 143-44, 160-61.
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2. The Repressive Years Begin: 1911-21
The years of 1911-21 represent a decade of extreme faculty
and campus presidential political repression by the Board. The
repression started with the 1911 firing of popular University of
Montana President Duniway after only three years in the position." His main difficulties with the Board arose over his insistence upon hiring law faculty from across the nation based on
academic merit, rather than alumni lawyers practicing in Montana (including the locally powerful University Alumni Association President). The Board terminated him without a hearing."
In 1912, the Board hired former Tulane President Craighead, a
nationally prominent educator and tried to put the controversy
behind it. Shortly thereafter, however, the Board adopted a rule
requiring all faculty to submit proposed publications for review
by a Board Committee on Publications.'
Dr. Craighead's presidency proved to be relatively shortlived despite his prominence and relative popularity on campus
because the Board fired him and three faculty members three
years later." This triggered a national higher education uproar
over the Board's governance of Montana's public universities.6 7
Dr. Craighead's problems appear to have stemmed partly from
outspoken support for consolidation of Montana's public campuses into one state university despite strong gubernatorial opposition and despite decisive rejection by voters in a 1915 ballot
issue. Dr. Craighead also had philosophical and political differences with Missoula's Local Executive Board Chair. 8 The three
faculty members lost their positions as a result of testifying
against Dr. Craighead at an impromptu "hearing" called by the
Local Board Chair to review problems with Dr. Craighead's presidency, after which Dr. Craighead's State Board supporters (unable to block his firing) secured their terminations in the interest
of even-handedness. 9 Investigating the faculty firings along
with President Craighead's, the American Association of University Professors (AAUP) reviewed Board performance since its
creation:

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

See id. at 191-94.
See id. at 188, 191-94.
This rule was adopted amidst heated public objection. See id. at 212-13.
See id. at 235, 237.
See id. at 261-65.
See id. at 236.
See id. at 237-38.
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The state board of education for many years has, as a body,
apparently been destitute of a proper sense of the ordinary
courtesies and amenities, in its dealings with officers and
teachers of the universities."
[The Board also has] scant appreciation of the fact that the
removal of a university president should take place only for
serious cause and after full consideration; and equally scant
appreciation of the fact that continuity of policy and stability in
administration are important
71 factors in the success of any institution of higher education.
The AAUP also scathingly criticized the Board for the following: (1) allowing the Governor to influence President Craighead's
firing over the latter's consolidation views; (2) President
Duniway's "dead of night" dismissal over law school faculty hiring standards; and (3) Montana's "bad system of administration"
as manifested by the Board's ongoing fights with the State Board
of Examiners over university budget and spending authority.72
Finally, AAUP deemed President Craighead's firing an "unwarranted infringement of the liberty of utterance of educational
officials upon questions of educational policy," and deemed the
procedures for doing it "unsound in method and disastrous in its
results."7 3 It termed dismissal of the faculty members a "violation of the essential principles of sound educational administration" lacking "ordinary requirements of equity.., an even worse
violation of correct procedure, illogical and unethical to a degree."74 AAUP members who signed this report included nationally and world prominent faculty leaders from Harvard, Brown,
Columbia, Cornell, Yale, Princeton, Johns Hopkins, Indiana
University, and the Universities of California, Washington and
Wisconsin.
During the Craighead and faculty firings period, the Board
hired Montana's first permanent Chancellor of Higher Education,
Edward Elliot, who had in the past served as the University of
Wisconsin Education Dean, in the hopes he would be able to

70. Id. at 264 (citing Report of the Committee of Inquiry Concerning Charges of
Violation of Academic Freedom Involving the Dismissal of the President and Three
Members of the Faculty at the University of Montana, AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF
UNIVERSITY PROFESSoRS BULLETIN 8 (May 1917) [hereinafter 1917 BULLETIN]).
71.
1917 BULLETIN, supra note 70, at 184.
72. Id. at 9-17, 84.
73. Id. at 42.
74. Id. at 43.
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salvage the situation.7 5 However, the damage to Montana's
higher education reputation was serious, and the story was
merely beginning.
A brief historical description of the chancellor position helps
illustrate the political instability plaguing the State Board and
Montana's universities in general. In 1914, the Board responded
to extensive criticism about weak state higher education planning and administration by deciding to hire its first chancellor,
with the ostensible blessing of the four campus presidents.7"
Less than a year later, the legislature responded by passing a
bill to abolish the position, even while the Board was searching
for a suitable candidate to fill it. Fortunately for Dr. Elliott, the
Governor (a Board member and often the actual Board leader)
vetoed the bill and the legislature sustained his veto." Dr.
Elliott set the tone for this era 7s by openly attacking and trying
to abolish all student publications and many student organizations.79
The Board earned a reputation for repression partly by allowing the Montana Council of Defense s0 to dictate university
academic and student enrollment policies by banning all German
language books and classes.8 1 The Council had broad subpoena
powers to enforce its mandates, but the Board and Chancellor
made certain that all campuses complied with whatever the
Board instructed.8 2
The Board also earned its negative reputation for criticizing
University of Montana faculty for "improper utterings and pri-

75. See Chenette, supra note 42, at 240. "Dr. Elliott, reportedly, was repeatedly
warned by numerous prominent educators to stay away from Montana, that the situation was complex, dangerous and very likely unsolvable." Id. at 241.
76. See id. at 225.
77. See id.
78. Dr. Chenette describes the 1916-21 post-Craighead firing as "Years of Repression" and as "perhaps the most despicable period in the history of the State
Board of Education. The Board knuckled under [to] the pressure groups both within
and without . . . and permitted itself to become the prime instrument for the repression of higher education in the state." Id. at 244.
79. See id. at 251-52.
80. This is a state mega-agency created to assist the national World War I effort.
81. See id. at 270-74; "A watchdog agency of superpatriots, the Council came to
rule every aspect of the daily lives of every man, woman, and child in the state
during the World War [including] . .. what the people could say, what they could
write; what they could read; [and] finally . .. what was to be taught in the schools
and what books were to be kept in the libraries." Id. at 270.
82. See id. at 271.
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vate teachings." 3 One faculty member, Dr. Louis Levine, became another national "cause celebre" to those favoring academic
freedom when he was suspended from his economics professorship in 1919 for publishing a report which advocated taxing
Montana's mining interests more heavily to help the state resolve its chronic fiscal crises." In this instance, Dr. Elliott had
apparently encouraged Dr. Levine to study the topic (and even
appointed him to a special new state taxation study group) only
to withdraw his support when faced with mining interests' attacks."
After Dr. Levine had the report published without University support, Dr. Elliott suspended him without consulting the
Board.' A special university committee reviewed Dr. Elliot's
decision and urged the Board to lift his suspension." The Board
first refused, but after aggressive AAUP intervention in the case
the Board reinstated Dr. Levine." Despite Dr. Levine's reinstatement, the faculty formed a University American Federation
of Teachers branch soon thereafter."
The next Board faculty controversy involved University of
Montana Law Professor Arthur Fisher, who incurred the enmity
of several Board members and other elected officials, along with
a number of conservative state groups, when he worked with a
politically progressive newspaper in 1921.' 0 After the Montana
American Legion accused him of "pacifism" and draft-dodging
during World War I and confronted the Board with Fisher's work
with the newspaper, the Board suspended Professor Fisher.9
Chancellor Elliott, who apparently disagreed with the Board
decision,
resigned his position and left Montana soon thereaf92
ter.

83. Id. at 274.
84. See id at 280-81.
85. See id. at 278-83.
86. See id. at 281.
87. See id.
88. See Chenette, supra note 42, at 281-82. Dr. Chenette writes: "[The Board
was] exposed for the second time in two years as being vindictive, capricious, and
petty; and worst of all, the University System which, as everyone knew by now, was
ruled despotically by a board of despots." Id. at 282.
89. See id
90. See id. at 298.
91. See id. at 296-99; Report on University of Montana, AMERICAN ASSOCIATION
OF UNIVERsrrY PROFESSORS BULLETIN (Mar. 1994). See also, Sheila Stearns, The
Arthur Fisher Case (1969) (unpublished M.Ed. thesis, The University of Montana) (on
file with author).
92. See Chenette, supra note 42, at 299-300.
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The Fisher controversy was the last nationally visible Montana faculty dispute for two decades which involved the Board,
as the Board turned its attention towards coping with a severe
economic depression. However, other Board abuses of faculty
continued during this period, until national attention again refocused on Montana.
3. Economic Depression: 1919-39
Montana experienced a major economic depression more
than a decade before the rest of the nation, when severe drought
combined with low farm prices devastated state finances. Even
before this occurred, public campuses were experiencing fiscal
stress because the state lacked money to fund them adequately.
In 1916, Dr. Elliott publicly cautioned the Board that Montana's
public campuses were headed for difficulty if funding could not
be increased (at that time Montana ranked fortieth of the 48
states for public higher education spending).9" The Board appeared ill-equipped to legally or politically respond, and when depression hit, the campuses were even more poorly equipped to
deal with it effectively.
Dr. Chenette terms the depression period as "one of frequent
and appalling asininity" manifested by the state's political leaders, who approved two new campuses at the height of the state
and national depression despite having less state revenue for
94
public higher education than was available 10 years earlier.
Even though these years began well when Montana voters approved both a higher education mill levy and a campus construction bond issue, feuds within the Board of Examiners over how
to spend the bond money plagued the campuses for years to
come.

95

In 1923, the Board limited enrollment because the four existing campuses lacked enough buildings to accommodate the
students seeking an education, even with the 1920 bond funds.
Even if there had been enough money to pay to build additional

93.
See id. at 252-53.
94. Id. at 304-05.
At a time when highly-qualified professors were deserting Montana's institutions by the score and it was necessary to hire poorly-qualified instructors
because they would work for less money, the Board could fire with no compunction . . . exceptionally-qualified professors for the most foolhardy of reasons.
Id. at 305.
95.
See id. at 289-94.
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buildings, campus operating budgets were inadequate to hire
enough faculty. Notwithstanding these problems, the 1925 Legislature approved two new campuses in Havre and Billings.98
This legislative decision reduced funds available for the four
existing campuses and forced the Board of Examiners to freeze
some of their funds. The Board of Education responded by firing
ten highly-qualified professors and replacing them with less
qualified professors who would accept less pay.97 State finances
in general were so poor that the Board of Examiners tried to use
higher education mill levy funds for non-campus purposes until
the Montana Supreme Court barred this in 1926.98
In addition to the state's 1925-26 fiscal woes, the Board also
provoked two academic freedom controversies in 1926. The first
controversy occurred when the Board fired a popular, tenured,
University of Montana faculty member from the English department, for assisting a student with a creative writing journal in
his spare time. 99 The second controversy occurred when the
Board fired a popular University of Montana faculty member
from the Business School who had feuded with the President.
This dismissal was followed by a Board investigation concluding
that the President was at fault in the controversy. The Board
then fired the President, but refused to reinstate the faculty
member to his job."°
Montana's higher education problems in the 1920s did not go
unnoticed by people in the state. This is evidenced by the fact
that many citizens refused to send their children to study at the
state's campuses for reasons unrelated to the depression since
graduates from the state's high schools left Montana in droves to
enroll in colleges outside the state. Only twenty-eight percent of
high school graduates who went to college chose to do so in Montana."' In 1928, because of these conditions one-third of all

96. Dr. Chenette writes: "Two less wise decisions, in view of the times, could
not have been made by Montana's legislators. The state's four institutions of higher
education, already established, were languishing for want of adequate funds." Id. at
314.
97. Id. at 317.
98. See id. at 319; State ex rel. v. Erickson, 75 Mont. 429, 244 P. 287 (1926).
99. Frontier was not even an official University publication. The journal published a scholarly article on a former Missoula brothel which caused mild public
uproar, the professor's firing and the student writer's expulsion despite the lack of
any prurient content. Frontier, an all-volunteer student effort off campus, ceased
publishing even though it had developed a reputation "as the best of its kind in the
nation" among student literary magazines. See Chenette, supra note 42, at 322-25.
100. See id. at 331-33.
101. Id. at 334. "The exodus of students was damning testimony of the sorry re-
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University of Montana faculty resigned to go elsewhere to work
as professors.0 2
In 1929 a special Educational Survey Commission created by
the 1927 Legislature to study Montana public education informed the Board that "Montana lagged far behind all other
Northwest states in the support of higher education. The future
of higher education in Montana would be bleak, indeed, if financial support was not increased." 3 This report was so negative
that the Board kept it from public release for nearly a year after
completion, partly because it revealed that Montana was spending one-third less on its public campuses than any other state of
similar age."
Despite the state's depression, the Survey Commission report combined with a heavy advocacy campaign by the Board
persuaded Montana voters to approve both a higher education
mill levy increase and a new $4 million bond issue in 1930. However, regrettably, the Montana Supreme Court nullified the election because of sloppy language on the ballot and most of the
funds were not forthcoming. 5 The effect of this decision was
all too predictable. By 1932, higher education in Montana was a
in sorry state-the majority of high school graduates were going
to colleges out of Montana, the physical plants were decaying, a
much needed bond issue was declared invalid, and less-qualified
°6
professors were hired as a matter of policy to save money.'
A few years later when University of Montana President
Clapp died, the Board could find no non-Montana university
presidents willing to apply for the job because campus finances

pute into which the University System had fallen in 1927 among her own citizens,
students and parents alike, and of the sad state of affairs (overcrowded conditions,
the enforced hiring of poorly qualified professors, and deteriorating buildings) on all
campuses." Id.
102.
See id. at 336.
103.
Id. at 338.
104. See id. at 332-33. The Legislature responded to the above problems by either ignoring them, or by forcing the overcrowded, underfunded campuses to do even
more work with fewer resources. In 1929, Montana's Supreme Court upheld the validity of a 1927 law requiring the Bozeman campus to do free chemical testing of oil
products for other state agencies and the Board was powerless to stop it. See State
ex rel. Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Brannon, 86 Mont. 200, 283 P. 202 (1929). The Court
found that, because of the Board's dependence on the legislature, it was simply another agency of the state government and a part of the executive department subject
to legislative control. See id. at 209, 283 P. at 208.
105. See Chenette, supra note 42, at 344-45; Herrin v. Erickson, 90 Mont. 259, 2
P.2d 296 (1931).
106. See Chenette, supra note 42, at 347. 1930-31 public higher education expenditures per student were 13 percent less than 1915-16. See id. at 348.
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were so precarious. The Board was forced to hire an internal
faculty member candidate over intense objection by faculty colleagues regarding his modest qualifications. The Board also
failed to attract any external candidate to replace
the Bozeman
10 7
campus President for similar financial reasons.
The national depression did help Montana campuses meet
some physical plant needs when WPA and Public Works Administration (PWA) constructed several new buildings. However, the
depression so demoralized the state that it continued to harm
the campuses for three years after it ended in 1936. The 1937
Legislature did not believe that the drought had really ended
and refused to increase appropriations for the 1937-1939 biennium even though campus budgets had been stagnant since 1923
while enrollments had nearly doubled." s The Legislature,
Board and Governor also continued their state governance feud
during these years concerning the chancellor position. The Legislature passed a bill abolishing the chancellor position in response
to Chancellor Brannon's public criticism of the Legislature's
refusal to fund the campuses. The Governor then vetoed the bill
after Chancellor Brannon agreed to resign. Finally, the Board
decided to abolish the office administratively by replacing it with
an Executive Secretary having limited power. 9
4. Faculty Repression Returns in the Late 1930s
In 1936 and 1939, after a long hiatus and while the depression was winding down, the Board revived its censorship and
personnel harassment activity. The Board first adopted a rule
requiring "proper standards" in the selection, purchase, distribution, and use of all books, periodicals, and plays on the campuses. This rule also required that Presidents be involved in "proper
coordination" of any events. A year later the Board began firing
faculty based on violation of this new rule and general public
criticism of the Board. 110

107. See id. at 354.
108. See Id. at 304.
109. See id. at 351.
110. A year later, the Board fired Philip Keeney, a University of Montana librarian and tenured faculty member, at the request of President Simmons because Dr.
Keeney had allegedly violated this rule, and had openly opposed the Simmons selection as President. Dr. Keeney proved wrongful termination and won his reinstatement in court. See id. at 356-58; State ex rel. Keeney v. Ayers, 108 Mont. 547,
92 P.2d 306 (1939).
When the chair of the Geology Department made public objection to President
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The Board actions discussed above triggered outcries of
protest in the state and nation. "Public indignation ... was immediate. Newspaper editors were predicting dire consequences as
the result of the action of the board-a decrease in enrollment,
financial support and the influence of the University."' The
AAUP investigated these events and expressed doubts about
whether either President Simmons or the Board would be capable of understanding their gravity, especially when President
Simmons wrote that he had "no intention in the future of permitting... anyone... to engage in deliberative activities of
troublemaking or interference with the administration of this
institution and standing idly by while such activities occur.""
Concerned with the University of Montana's tarnished national reputation, Montana United States Senator, Burton
Wheeler, wrote President Simmons and the Board in October
1939 to ask for an explanation of the situation and to voice his
endorsement of AAUP academic freedom principles in Montana." Neither the AAUP's warnings nor Senator Wheeler's
concerns appeared to have effect on President Simmons or the
Board. However, official AAUP censure in late 1939 did evoke a
response by. the Board.114 The Board responded to AAUP cen-

Simmons' overall conduct, the Board revoked his tenure based on his age and tried
to force retirement.
It next tried to fire a senior administrator who had been acting President (and
a rival for the permanent job filled by Dr. Simmons) for alleged assault of a female
employee, despite the fact that a court exonerated him of all charges. Finally, a
Board Committee cited five senior University of Montana faculty members as "disloyal" to President Simmons and recommended their firing (including Dr. Keeney, in
apparent violation of a court order). See Chenette, supra note 42, at 354-63.
These actions were apparently done pursuant to a 1937 law giving Montana's
Governor sweeping authority to remove most state employees from their positions,
with or without cause. See Academic Freedom and Tenure-Montana State University,
24 AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS BULLETIN 321, 322 (Apr. 1938)

[hereinafter Academic Freedom 1].
111. Chenette, supra note 42, at 364.
112. Academic Freedom I, supra note 110, at 348.
113. "It is important that Montana shall rank among the institutions which,
especially during the present emergency, must be relied on to act as the guardians
of civil liberties, of academic freedom and of the precious heritage of due process."
Concerning Montana State University, 25 AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS BULLETIN 579, 583 (Dec. 1939).

114. AAUP found that "administrative policies affecting academic freedom and
tenure and faculty-administrative relations are such as to justify censuring by this
Association." Academic Freedom and Tenure-Montana State University, 26 AMERICAN
ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS BULLETIN 73, 90 (Feb. 1940) [hereinafter

Academic Freedom II]. AAUP further found:
There is evidence tending to show an undue influence exercised over University affairs by Missoula business interests, that President Simmons owed
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sure by holding a hearing at the Missoula campus in January
1940. At least half the University faculty urged the Board not to
fire their colleagues, and most of them sharply criticized President Simmons. The Board agreed not to terminate any faculty,
but it formally "instructed" all faculty to respect President
Simmons' authority: "to refrain from public statements which
might arouse controversy, and to make any complaints or accusations they had to make to the local executive board."11 The
AAUP found these actions inadequate and continued censure.11 Thus, the 1930s ended with Montana public campuses
trying to recover from fiscal and political chaos.
5. Governance Reforms Slowly Begin: 1939-72
The year 1939 ended not only with AAUP censure, but also
with the Montana Taxpayers Association excoriation of the state
over its poorly funded public higher education. These developments began focusing state attention on how to improve higher
education quality through meaningful governance reform. In
1942, the Governor persuaded his fellow Board members to fire
President Simmons. The firing occurred without public outcry or
charges of political interference, in the midst of reaction to a
1941 legislative study which found almost everything wrong with
Montana's public campuses. During the 1940s the Board wavered between recreating and abolishing the chancellor position.1 7 A 1944 Higher Education Commission called for a con-

his . . . presidency to that group.. . . There was also evidence of a widespread distrust among the faculty of President Simmons . . . a somewhat
far-reaching belief that President Simmons has not displayed and does not
possess the qualities requisite for the president of an institution of higher
learning.
Id. at 89.
115. Academic Freedom and Tenure-Montana State University, 26 AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS BULLETIN 602 (Dec. 1940) [hereinafter Academic Freedom III]; see also Chenette, supra note 42, at 364.
116. AAUP concluded that "until past injustices have been rectified, and until
experience demonstrates that members of the faculty . . . are free to disagree with
the President on matters of university policy without jeopardizing their positions . . .
the administration of the University should be continued on the Association's list of
censured administrations." Academic Freedom III, supra note 115, at 606.
"Concerning the Board's reference to the unfavorable publicity the University
has received in recent years, it should be kept in mind that this publicity was not of
the faculty's seeking, although the [Board] report places responsibility for this publicity on the faculty. The Board itself created a large amount of unfavorable publicity by
its request . . . for the resignations of five professors." Id.
117. Meanwhile, University of Montana President Melby assumed the Chancellorship in 1943 and quit a year later because the office lacked any legal power.
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stitutionally autonomous higher education governing board and
the closing of one or more campuses for financial reasons. However, the legislature did not agree with either proposal and
blocked modest Board attempts to eliminate program duplication."8
After the end of World War II, the need for governance
changes became more pressing as campus enrollment mushroomed beyond the Board's ability to manage and fund it. Voters
approved a large mill levy increase in 1948, and real improvements seemed imminent. Unfortunately, the 1948 elections created three new elected official positions on the Board of Examiners which effectively impeded progress for three years as the
Governor and Board of Education fought with no success against
the Attorney General and Secretary of State over where and how
to spend higher education construction funds." This stalemate
brought the newly created Northwest Association to Montana for
its first accreditation trip, during which the Association criticized
the Board for its inability to resolve its own differences for the
benefit of the state's educational system.'
Frustrated with the two Boards' inability to resolve their
fiscal differences, the 1951 Legislature chose to side with the
State Board of Education and gave it sole authority to administer public higher education spending.' 2 ' However, the legislature was concerned that this Board of Education might become
too powerful; as a result, the legislature zero-funded the
chancellor's office in the appropriations bill."
Thus, conditions remained unchanged from the previous
decade. "The University System was again racked by internal
strife, the State Board of Education was under criticism by education associations, and the chancellor's office in limbo. In ten

118. See Chenette, supra note 42, at 365, 374-406.
119. The latter two elected officials used their offices to steer these funds to the
Havre and Billings campuses; and when Havre's President publicly supported them
the Board of Education apparently fired him for it in 1950.
120. See Chenette, supra note 42 at 374-434. The State Superintendent of Public
Instruction also expressed serious concern to her State Board of Education member
colleagues about the many disparaging comments she was hearing at national educator meetings over the Havre President firing without any prior hearing.
121. A state district court upheld the new law's validity soon after its enactment.
122. See Chenette, supra note 42 at 434-36. Readers interested in the tortured
legal and political history of Montana's Chancellor position should also see H. M.
Seel, The Effect of the 1972 Constitution on the Administration of Higher Education
in Montana 13-22 (1982) (unpublished MPA thesis, University of Montana) (on file
with the University of Montana Library).
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years... nothing had really changed."'
The 1950s witnessed few changes from the prior decade. The
Board finally decided to hire an Executive Secretary with limited
powers rather than a Chancellor. (This statute was later formally abolished by statute). Dissatisfied members of the Board of
Examiners briefly blocked all public campus out-of-state travel
funds in 1952, but the Governor lifted this. In 1956, the Board
faced its worst financial crisis since the depression because of
rapidly rising enrollments and responded by making the largest
tuition and fee increase in state history.
In 1958, the American Legion demanded that the Board
select and censor all campus speakers to allow only pro-American speakers. However, for the first time, the Board refused to
adopt the policy.' Also, in 1958, the Board learned how to resolve campus fiscal crises solely by raising student tuition and
fees. This in turn caused University of Montana President
McFarland to resign rather than be fired for refusing to fund
raises for some faculty members by terminating first year instructors.'25
A significant governance development occurred in 1958 when
a University of Utah expert recommended a separate Board of
Regents for public higher education with either corporate or
constitutionally autonomous status. Although the Montana system of higher education may have been "the most studied in the
nation," (by this time almost a dozen recommendations had been
ignored by the Board and the legislature) the 1959 Legislature
took notice and heeded the suggestions of the Durham Report.
The Legislature passed a proposed constitutional amendment to
create a separate Board of Regents (albeit subject solely to powers set by statute). However, the Governor refused to sign it and
the Montana Supreme Court kept the measure off the 1960 ballot for this reason.'26

123. Chenette, supra note 42, at 436.
124. See Id. at 437-65.
125.
See id. at 470.
126.
See id. at 471-77; State ex rel. Livingstone v. Murray, 137 Mont. 557, 354
P.2d 552 (1960); Schaefer, supra note 45, at 193; Laurance R. Waldoch, Constitutional Control of the Montana University System: A Proposed Revision, 33 MONT. L. REv.
76 (1971).
The sole surviving remnant of this legal and political fiasco was a .1959 "stopgap" statute adding a "Board of Regents" title to the same State Board of Education,
with no new powers or members. Seel, supra note 122, at 25.
The Durham Report did not go unheeded, however, since it ultimately served
as a basis for creation of today's Board of Regents in 1972.
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Relatively little has been written about Montana's public
higher education governance by the Board of Education during
the 1960s. Thus, one can only assume there was a general absence of conflicts like those described above. However, the Board
refused to give the Executive Secretary any significant authority
despite a legislative recommendation that it do so, perhaps be27
cause of reluctance to revive any chancellorship controversy.1
The 1960s apparently saw few changes from the 1950s, at least
from a Board governance perspective. However, the Board's weak
legal and political powers continued to impair the Board's ability
to find adequate funding for public higher education. Thus the
eighty-three tumultuous years of Board governance began winding down with little fanfare. The effect of this troubled period on
Montana's public higher education continued to be deeply felt by
The freshness of this distress
the citizens of Montana.'
formed the basis for why Montana's 1972 Constitutional Convention framers, and ultimately Montana's citizens, so eagerly embraced change.
B. The 1972 ConstitutionalConvention: A Mandate for Change
The exact legal status with which to clothe higher education in
Montana was debated extensively and thoroughly in the sessions of the... [1972] Constitutional Convention. That substantial and far reaching changes were intended is evident even
from a casual comparison between the old and the new constitution. The debate in the... Convention reflected the ongoing
national debate over the structure of higher education in
American educational history. M
When the debate in Montana ended, the framers had decided:

127. Seel, supra note 122 at 29.
128. Dr. Chenette makes two noteworthy observations about Board impact on the
state:
The Board's predilection for summary dismissals and adoption of policies
which suppressed academic freedom . . . must have led many professors to
decide to teach elsewhere other than in Montana, and discouraged much
scholarly research, speech, and publication. Such repressive measures must
also have kept many outstanding individuals from seeking employment in
the Montana University System.
Chenette, supra note 42, at 484. In addition, the Board's dual responsibility for elementary, secondary and higher education "has positively been to the detriment of the
Board's effective administration of the University System. The Board has been unable
to devote the time it should to University affairs." Id. at 487 (emphasis added).
129. Schaefer, supra note 45, at 190.
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"Full power of responsibility and authority to supervise, coordinate, manage and control [Montana's public universities] ... is
vested in the Board of Regents" as a constitutionally independent
entity free from most legislative control.13 The framers also
resolved the chancellor debate decisively in favor of a strong
statewide administrator by empowering the new Board of Regents to appoint a Commissioner of Higher Education as a constitutional officer. 1 ' Why the framers did so bears careful scrutiny here.
After the framers assessed various governance options, the
framers concluded that "direct legislative control under the old
system had proven unworkable. There was a need for autonomy
and relief from state administrative bureaucracy."3 2 They also
determined that:
Higher education is not simply another state service; the administrative structure of higher education cannot be considered
an ordinary state agency. The unique character of the college
and university stands apart from the business-as-usual of the
state. Higher learning and research is a sensitive area which
requires a particular kind of protection not matched in other
administrative functions of the state.'
The framers debated and rejected the proposal that a single
board be granted responsibility for governing all Montana public
education. In so doing, they recognized the need for effective
coordination at all levels of the state's myriad public education
activity. In response, the framers created two state constitutional
entities: a Board of Regents to govern higher education; and a
separate Board of Public Education to govern elementary and
secondary schools. The framers left the State Board of Education, comprised of both governing boards, to function as coordinator. 3' The Committee responsible for drafting this dual board
structure specially noted that all states, except Montana and
Idaho, had separate higher education governing boards not distracted by elementary and secondary education responsibilities.'
130. MONT. CONST. art. Y, § 9 (1972).
131. See id.; Schaefer, supra note 45, at 193-94; Seel, supra note 122, at 34.
132.
Schaefer, supra note 45, at 194 (citing remarks from Constitutional Delegate
Champoux, Chair of the Committee on Education and Public Lands which drafted
the 1972 Board of Regents language).
133.
COMMITTEE ON EDUCATION AND PUBLIC LANDS, MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION, VIII TRANSCRIPTS 6283 (1972).
134. See id.
135. The Committee concluded that Montana should not continue with status quo
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The 1972 Constitution framers reviewed scholarly studies
written about United States public higher education governance
and concluded that a Board of Regents model for Montana was
free of both legislative and bureaucratic intrusions and thus
accomplished the objectives suggested by the studies. 136 The
Committee also advocated protection of Montana's public campuses from other state agencies, and expressly referenced academic expert arguments regarding the threat of "bureaucratic
and political interference."" 7 Finally, the Committee cited the
Eisenhower Committee Report as authority for creating an independent Board of Regents in Montana free from other state
agency interference."M In summary, the framers adopted positions reflected in other state governance models that supported
board legal autonomy.
Another fundamental reason cited by the framers for a separate Board of Regents was protection of academic freedom."

because it was too hard for one board to do both effectively. See COMMITTEE ON
EDUCATION AND PUBLIC LANDS, MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, II TRANSCRIPTS 736 (1972) [hereinafter II TRANSCRIPTS].
136. Addressing the legislative interference question, the Convention Education
Committee reasoned: "The power to coordinate and operate the system of higher
education is one which properly belongs to an informed board of regents who have
the knowledge and ability to determine rationally the course of higher education ...
There is a clear need for a strong board of regents to make long range plans which
are appropriate to the needs of higher education and free from short term political
whims." COMMITTEE ON EDUCATION AND PUBLIC LANDS, MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION, I TRANSCRIPTS 34 (1972).
137. The Committee stated: "[M]aintenance of the system of higher education
free from unnecessary bureaucratic and political interference is important not only to
a healthy academic atmosphere, but also to the administrative efficiency of the system of higher education." Id. (citing Moos & ROURKE, supra note 32). The Committee also warned: "[A] more subtle kind of coercion has made its appearance . . . of
the sort which is likely to become an even greater threat to the integrity of higher
education in the future. . . the growing power of the centralized bureaucratic state."
II TRANSCRIPTS, supra note 135, at 736.
138. The Committee stated:
Research and instruction at the higher levels are not services for which
specific conditions can be written in advance, and for which one seeks the
lowest bidder. They are venture capital investments where one successful
strike in a multitude either in the form of a new idea, or a trained individual capable of producing them may spell the difference between a forwardmoving or retrograding nation.
II TRANSCRIPTS, supra note 135, at 738 (citing The Efficiency of Freedom, supra note
32; Moos & ROURKE, supra note 32).
139. The framers noted:
Few would dispute the vital importance of academic freedom to the process
of higher learning. Such freedom is the essence of the American higher
education system. The great movements of mankind have come out of the
great modern schools, the modern university system, ever since the time of
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Given Montana's tortured history and its reputation for suppressing academic freedom, these arguments carried special
significance.
The framers ultimately chose Michigan's governance system
as a model upon which to create an autonomous Board of Regents." ° As demonstrated above, Michigan had perhaps the
most constitutionally autonomous public higher education system
in the country and has now served as the model for every other
state with a similar governance structure."" Moreover, when
the delegates debated this issue they rejected various proposed
floor amendments aimed at weakening the Montana Board's
autonomous powers, including amendments which would have
restored legislative control over university system finances and
administrative decision-making."
Montana voters confirmed
the Convention decision by voter approval of the entire 1972
Constitution, and July 1973 witnessed the legal birth of the
state's first autonomous governing board.
C. Regents Governance Since 1972: Some General Observations
Only one scholarly work has assessed Montana's Board of
Regents since 1972, and its scope is relatively limited.' Dr.
Seel concluded that as of 1983 "the original intention of the convention [to create an autonomous Board] has not been realized."'" She criticized the Board for falling short of gaining

the Renaissance. And the greatest of these movements have come out of the
schools . . . unfettered by controls that would tend to stifle them. Only in
an atmosphere of independent . . . unfettered inquiry can an objective pursuit of knowledge be conducted which is unhindered by prejudice and vested
interest. The great contributions to both scientific and humanistic learning
which have emerged from American colleges and universities can be attributed in large part to the freedom traditionally enjoyed by the teachers and
students at such institutions.
II TRANSCRIPTS, supra note 135, at 2053.
140. This was "copied from the Michigan Constitution and the Michigan system."
Schaefer, supra note 45, at 198 (citing COMMIrrEE ON EDUCATION AND PUBLIC
LANDS, MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, IX TRANSCRIPTS 6473 (1972) [hereinafter IX TRANSCRIPTS]).
141. See supra notes 22-25 and (accompanying text).
142. See Schaefer, supra note 45, at 195-96 (citing IX TRANSCRITS, supra note
140, at 6532).
143. See Seel, supra note 122, at 70.
144.
"Legislation passed after the constitution went into effect differed little from
that . . . enacted before its ratification. In effect, the legislature was refusing to acknowledge the new authority and independence of the board and was continuing to
concern itself with university matters over which it no longer had any jurisdiction."
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"the independence and authority intended for it by the framers
of the constitution." 14 In addition, she criticized the various
Commissioners "for assuming too much authority and for exercising it with little regard for the effect" their actions would have
"on the administration of higher education as a whole."1" Because her work only covered the Board's first 10 years of existence, some of its relevance today may be questioned. However,
her argument that the legislature, with board consent and assistance, continued to pass bills outside the scope of what the 1972
framers intended, can be verified merely by cursory review of
applicable Montana Code provisions. 147 However, this review
reveals not a covert (or overt) legislative intent to restore pre1972 years of absolute legislative power over the campuses, but
rather a Board willingness to work in partnership with the Legislature in meeting state higher education concerns.
The lack of more recent scholarship regarding the Board
does not translate into a lack of significance for its activities.
Neither does it preclude some general observations here. The
Board of Regents has successfully stabilized Montana's higher
education system while at the same time eliminating significant
political controversies (notwithstanding the C-30 debate) such as:
those which drive so many Montanans to other states for university educations and those which caused faculty to work in fear,
find other employment outside of Montana, or never come to
Montana at all. Moreover, the Board has done so despite a lack
of solid financial support for public higher education in Montana
which has made Montana one of the country's most poorly funded public campuses." Finally, the Board has governed the system free of criminal or ethical scandals. 9

145.
Id.
146.
Id.
See infra text accompanying notes 256-57.
147.
148. Despite these fiscal shortcomings, however, the Montana University System
has gained national respectability and its faculty now enjoy prominent status in their
respective fields. The Board has also done a commendable job of managing the modest fiscal resources, as manifested by AAA ratings received on various Board bond issues over the past several years. The fiscal situation seems to be improving, as the
Board has successfully encouraged campuses to supplement their modest state appropriations with funds from numerous other sources which now reflect some 70 percent
of all System dollars.
For example, the 1994-97 controversies involving the Montana Board of
149.
Regents role in University System land sales and described herein resulted in a
finding by the Montana Attorney General that: "tihere is no evidence or suggestion
of fraud or conflict of interest" in these transactions. MONTANA ATTORNEY GENERAL,
REPORT TO THE STATE LAND BOARD. LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE DISPOSITION OF PUBLIC
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D. 1994 Government Reorganization Task Force: C-30's Genesis
Given all of these factors, C-30 seemed to be proposing radical changes unsupported by evidence that these changes were
needed to correct serious problems. In fact, the genesis of C-30
was not a result of a real need, but rather a broad 1994 state
government reform movement which gave little thought to the
need for reform or the history of public campus governance in
Montana.
In 1994, Montana Governor Racicot formed the
Task Force To Renew Montana Government and charged this
Task Force to carefully study the entirety of state and local government in Montana and to recommend any needed or desirable
changes.15 ° The Task Force, assisted by a Committee of Montana Education experts, made a key recommendation after
months of meetings and hearings, which served as the genesis
for C-30. The Task Force recommendation was that Montana's
Constitution should be amended to create: (1) a new Education
Department, headed by a gubernatorially appointed Director;
and (2) a new lay Commission on Education with no enumerated
powers which would replace not only the Board of Regents, but
also the Commissioner of Higher Education, the Superintendent
of Public Instruction, and the Board of Public Education. 1 ' In
support of this recommendation, the Task Force wrote:
A matter of concern to many and confusion to most is the cumbersome combination of public offices and authorities which
currently oversee Montana's public education system [referring
to the Regents, Board of Public Education and Superintendent
of Public Instruction]. 52
The Task Force also observed:
The existing organizational structure is not conducive to coordinated management of kindergarten through graduate school
education. The responsibility for implementation of education

LANDS BY THE MONTANA UNIVERSITY
Governor found "a general sense that

SYSTEM (Apr. 15, 1996). Moreover, Montana's

...

the spirit of the law was complied with, if
not the letter, and to the extent there may be questions about value, in most of the
cases the amounts would be so insignificant as to not [be worth the] litigation to try
to fight over issues of fair market value." MONTANA STATE LAND BOARD, MINUTES,
(Sept. 16, 1996). See discussion infra Part VIII.B.
150.
See THE GOVERNOR'S TASK FORCE TO RENEW MONTANA GOVERNMENT, PREPARING FOR A NEW CENTURY: FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS (Oct. 1994) [hereinafter PREPARING].

151.
152.

See id. at 15.
Id.
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policy is fragmented and compromised due to the competing
perspectives of the Board of Public Education, Superintendent
of Public Instruction, Board of Regents, the Commissioner of
Higher Education and the Governor."
It further observed that State Board of Education (comprised of
the Regents and Board of Public Education) had never satisfied
its mandate to coordinate and evaluate Montana's public education policies and programs at all levels." The Task Force recommended new Education Department and Commission objectives which included provisions for:
Coordination of Montana public education from kindergarten
through graduate school, and providing management of a seamless education system.
Provision of a more cohesive executive level structure for Montana public education at all levels.
Provision of more educational budget integration.
Separation of education policy from partisan politics.'55
In other words, the Task Force proposed that Montana return to
a single board (the Education Commission), with a single new
state constitutional official (the Education Department Director),
having responsibility for all Montana public education.
This proposed structure would have essentially returned the
state to the time when this same structure failed the state.
Montana's 1889 Constitutional Convention disregarded the earlier territorial constitution's proposed separate Board of Regents
because the 1889 delegates believed that with one Board that
dealt with all levels of education a greater degree of unity and
coordination would be achieved.'56 Scholars and political leaders alike found that by 1972, dual State Board of Education
responsibility for higher education, elementary and secondary
schools had been to the detriment of the Board's effective administration of the university system.'57 As indicated above, the
1972 Constitutional framers also found that elementary and

153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Id.
See id.
Id.
Chenette, supra note 42, at 481.
Id. at 487 (emphasis added).
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secondary education fared somewhat poorly under State Board of
Education governance for the same reasons. Because a single
board had already proved unable to meet state educational
needs, it is hard to see how a'gubernatorially appointed Education Department Director, with the same diffused responsibilities
would fare any better. It is also dubious that an Education Department Director, whose position depends solely on a governor
chosen by partisan election, can meet the Task Force goal of
separating education policy from partisan politics.1"
The Task Force recommendation was only partially accepted
in the legislature. House Bill 229, which was the basis of C-30
and appeared to eliminate the Board of Regents and create the
Education Commission and Department by constitutional
amendment, was passed, but House Bill 228, which abolished
the Board of Public Education and Superintendency of Public Instruction by constitutional amendment, was not.159 Thus, Montana voters faced a C-30 ballot choice that included only the
option of returning to a higher education governance system and
left Montana's campuses to the mercies of a politically weak
Board subject to total legislative control, without even the benefit of the education coordination objectives identified by the 1994
Task Force. Voters rejected this option in favor of the status quo.
Even if Montana voters had not had the lesson of Montana's
history, the public policy arguments and authorities which support and refute the merits of constitutionally autonomous public
higher education governing boards support the decision made by
the voters. As described above, no state has a higher education
governance system resembling what C-30 was proposing. As
illustrated below, no state should ever desire to adopt one.
IV. ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST CONSTITUTIONALLY

AUTONOMOUS BOARDS

The history of United States public higher education combined with current state public higher education laws reveals
158.
159.

See PREPARING, supra note 150.
Article XIV, Section 8, of the Montana Constitution requires that two-thirds,

or 100 of Montana's 150 legislators, approve a proposed constitutional amendment by
legislative referendum. House Bill 229 passed the 1995 House by a 67-33 margin on
January 26; passed the Senate in amended form by a 29-21 margin on March 2; and
passed the House on March 9 by a 71-29 vote, the minimum 100 legislators needed.
MONTANA HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, JOURNAL (Jan. 26, 1995; March 9, 1995);
MONTANA SENATE, JOURNAL (March 2, 1995). House Bill 228 passed the House by a
62-38 margin on February 13, but was killed in Senate Committee on March 16.
MONTANA HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, JOURNAL (Feb. 13, 1995).
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broad divergence among the states with regard to their public
higher education governing boards. Only a minority of states
have chosen autonomous boards like Montana's, while most
states favor state legislative power to define permissible public
campus activity. It is therefore reasonable to question the importance of autonomy in Montana. A review of legal and policy issues related to governing board autonomy in general can perhaps address questions that may be raised should Montanans
face the autonomy issue again in future elections.
A. Arguments FavoringIncreasedAutonomy
1. Elected Official Inexpertness/Politicization
The Carnegie Commission advocated more public higher
education independence from state government oversight and
reasoned that "public higher education is a function of society
rather than of government, that colleges and universities perform most effectively and efficiently when control rests with the
university system, and that academic and administrative freedom are essential to the future of higher education."" ® The
scope of autonomy generally advocated by proponents includes
exclusive board or institutional administration authority delegated by the board over all of the following: (1) specific system and
campus budget expenditures and allocations, subject to postaudit review; (2) employee work assignments; (3) employee compensation and promotion decisions and criteria; (4) employee
hiring; (5) curriculum, degree program and course approval; (6)
academic freedom policies and protections; (7) enrollment and
new campus growth decisions; and (8) research and service definitions and administrative policies. 1 ' The Michigan Legisla-

160. Beckham Dissertation, supra note 5, at 2 (citing CARNEGIE COMMISSION,
supra note 35, at 20-24).
161. See Beckham Dissertation, supra note 5, at 148-49; CARNEGIE COMMISSION,
supra note 35, at 17-18. Autonomy advocates have identified various arguments
against leaving the above types of decisions to state legislative bodies:
Legislatures, made up of varied personnel and subject to frequent and violent changes in composition according to the fluctuating political fortunes of
parties and individuals, and convening for short and crowded sessions ...
cannot give the continuous study and wholehearted devotion which is required to the development of a wise educational policy for the state ....
[Flew if any members are likely to have had any experience in the study of
the problems of higher educational administration, and many of them will
possess but slight comprehension or any sympathy with the aims and methods of the academic and scientific teaching and research.
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ture adopted such reasoning nearly 150 years ago when it chose
a constitutionally autonomous board instead of trying to govern
that state's first public university. This effectively created perhaps the best quality United States public higher education
systems and institutions in the nineteenth century.
In addition to concerns about whether legislative officials
can effectively make important public higher education policy
decisions, autonomy proponents also cite fears of politicizing the
campuses. A survey of 1,400 higher education leaders from all
over the United States revealed that the most highly rated campuses from an administrative effectiveness standpoint were those
affording the greatest campus protection from outside political
authorities.6 2 Material shifts in academic decision-making authority from a state's public governing board to its political officials seems to almost guarantee more political criteria will be
used to guide this authority than desirable educational values.

Beckham, supra note 5, at 147 (citing E. C. ELLIOTr & M. M. CHAMBERS, THE COLLEGES AND THE COURTS 509 (1936)).
Dr. Eykamp's public higher education quality study observes:
[S]hort term gains available for politicians, in terms of avoiding higher
taxes or shifting money to activities with higher profiles for which they can
claim credit, provide a strong set of incentives for raiding the university's
budget .... If financial reductions with long term impact are gradual,
even constituent groups in the university may be unaware of the accumulating magnitude of the change.
Eykamp, supra note 27, at 99.
162.
"The politicization of the college or university is a serious and unresolved
problem or series of problems. It can come from the selection . . . of ideological radicals on a board (right or left) .... It can also originate in the use of the board by
the governor as a political platform .... The general experience is that academic
life, with its emphasis on the rational, on tolerance, and on the measured examination of what is true, does not mix well with the passionate and urgent advancement
of what some member of the community considers to be 'for the good' in the political
arena." C. KERR & M. GADE, ASSOCIATION OF GOVERNING BOARDS, THE GUARDIANS:
BOARDS OF TRUSTEES OF AMERICAN COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES: WHAT THEY Do
AND How WELL THEY DO IT 89-90 (1989). ECS recently wrote: "State higher education leadership is the most complex, difficult balancing act in state government.
There are no simple answers, no absolutes. While lessons can be drawn from other
states, there is no perfect model. Conflicts are the reality. The challenge is to resolve
these conflicts as close to the operating level (e.g., at the campus level or through
cooperation among campuses) and as close to the real problems as possible. Once
issues rise to the level of the governor and legislature, political as opposed to educational values tend to dominate the debate." HANDBOOK, supra note 6, at 40 (emphasis
added).
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2. State BureaucraticAgency Intrusion Concerns
In the mid-twentieth century, United States higher education leaders had serious concerns about the adverse effects of increased state administrative agency interference in campus activity. A 1952 national level commission appointed by President
Truman criticized state government for centralizing the impact
on higher education, "particularly where standardization of practices and uniformity of methods were being superimposed on the
public higher education system."" The 1959 Eisenhower Commission also expressed grave concerns about this problem when
it documented numerous bureaucratic intrusions and concluded
that these intrusions threatened the power of educational policy
making."' A number of individual states identified these problems during the 1980s and, in virtually all cases, resolved these
problems by creating laws which granted public governing
boards much more autonomy and created statutory exemptions
from the regulatory requirements of other state agencies."

163. Beckham Dissertation, supra note 5, at 145 (citing COMMISSION ON FINANCING HIGHER EDUCATION, NATURE AND NEEDS OF HIGHER EDUCATION 56 (1952).
164. Id. at 145-46 (citing THE EFFICIENCY OF FREEDOM, supra note 32, at 7).
Echoing Committee findings, other experts stated:
Perhaps the greatest threat to the state higher education system . . . is the
bureaucratic intrusion which received stimulus from delegations of power by
legislature or executive. Universities ... must therefore maintain full intellectual independence and autonomy ....
The threat of government control
has to be guarded against. But the significant threat is the impalpable
influence of government. The resources of government are so great that the
universities in their growth and in their direction may lose the power or
the will to be self-determining.
Beckham, Dissertation, supra note 5, at 147-48 (citing Frankel, Issues in Higher
Education, in HIGHER EDUCATION AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL SERVICE 41 (E. N.
Shriver ed., 1967).
Examples of agency intrusion deemed harmful by experts, virtually all resulting from statutes enacted in states without constitutionally autonomous boards, include pre-audit controls on higher education expenditures; rigid purchasing rules;
inflexible personnel regulations insensitive to unique campus skills needs; and antiquated public works construction policies which increase cost and delay in essential
campus facilities. See, e.g., Eykamp, supra note 27, at 23-24.
165.
Eykamp, supra note 27, at 24-27 (citing Hawaii, which had to grant the
University of Hawaii' fiscal autonomy to avert accreditation loss; New Jersey and
Kentucky, which exempted public campuses from fiscal controls and civil service
requirements imposed on other state agencies; New York, which found SUNY "the
most overregulated university [system] in the nation" and granted numerous statutory exemptions from other state agency rules; Colorado, which reduced legislative and
agency controls over public campus budgets; and Maryland, which increased fiscal
autonomy for its public campuses and exempted most of them from state purchasing
regulations). In his book assessing linkages between public higher education and
autonomy, Dr. Newman interviewed numerous governors and state legislative leaders,
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3. Intellectual and Academic Freedom
The previous arguments against legislative decision-making,
politicization and bureaucratic intrusion into campus governance
all reflect a common notion that unfettered any of these factors
can curtail intellectual and academic freedom on campus. Commentators and courts alike have unequivocally endorsed freedom
in United States public higher education and board legal autonomy as the means of protecting academic freedom." (Likewise,
United States
Administrations have protected freedom in higher
167
education).

The United States Supreme Court has forcefully defended
the need for academic freedom by striking down state legislation
and contradicting attorney general opinions which subjected

one of whom explained the necessity for more autonomy:
A university is not just like any other government agency. It is part of an
international community. Its mission is not focused on the state per se, but
on the pursuit, discovery, and transmission of knowledge. The harsh fact is
that our state government has forgotten that there are no great universities
run by government or budget analysts or legislators. There are no great
centers of learning that are forced to submit to the open mistrust and control that we think are appropriate in this state.
Id. at 57 (citing Governor Kean interview in F. NEWMAN, CHOOSING QUALITY: REDUCING CONFLICT BETWEEN THE STATE AND THE UNIVERSITY 8-9 (1987).
Most autonomy advocates would probably share two experts' view that "state
government in relation to public institutions should limit itself to budgets based on
broad general formulas versus line items, to missions . .. and to review of campus
performances." KERR & GADE, supra note 162, at 121.
166. In reaching this conclusion the Carnegie Commission observed: "No Holy
Writ gives higher education a right to reasonable independence for institutional actions. No natural law confers upon it escape from public surveillance. The case
for.., independence must be made with reasonable arguments." CARNEGIE COMMISSION, supra note 35, at 22-24. The Commission further noted:
The case for a reasonable independence from state government interference
rests on the historical tradition of autonomous colleges and universities and
on the professional nature of many of the decisions that must be made, on
the need to elicit the devotion and sense of responsibility of the major
groups internally involved, on the wisdom of drawing advice and support
from interested private citizens, on the costs of partisan political and bureaucratic intrusions ...
and on the experience of history on what works
best both academically and politically.
Id.
167.
In the midst of political protests on campuses against Vietnam and other
political actions, the Nixon Administration, although not generally sympathetic to
such campus activity, acknowledged "the need for independence among higher education institutions in order that ...
[they] may flexibly respond to the public's
postsecondary education needs." Beckham Dissertation, supra note 5, at 146 (citing
Assembly on University Goals and Governance, First Report (1971); and the U.S.
Office of Higher Education Task Force of Higher Education, Report on Higher Education (1971)).
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state public campus educators to loyalty litmus tests as conditions for remaining employed. In Sweezy v. New Hampshire the
United States Supreme Court made a strong statement against
such litmus tests:
The essentiality of freedom in the community of American universities is almost self-evident. No one should underestimate
the vital role in a democracy.., played by those who guide and
train our youth. To impose any strait jacket upon the intellectual leaders in our colleges and universities would imperil the
future of our nation.'
4. Arguments Favoring ConstitutionallyAutonomous Lay Boards
Those who oppose political and bureaucratic interference
with public campus decision-making by arguing that this interference is contrary to essential academic freedom believe that
the best structure for effectively resolving these concerns is the
constitutionally autonomous lay board. One expert has written:
"States must create [public campus governance] structures that
grant as much autonomy and fiscal flexibility as possible, conferring sufficient authority on leaders while clearly expecting accountability."" Another expert notes that long-term autonomous lay boards insulated from prevailing political winds are far
less likely to "cheat the future" on fiscal decisions since long
term prestige and responsibility factors tend to influence such
boards' behavior. 70 Others believe that the long term health of
United States public higher education requires the educational
system to be "as privatized and as autonomous as possible under
influential lay trustee control."'
One comprehensive economic study on United States public
higher education governance found that constitutionally autonomous campuses and systems are necessarily less regulated by
their state governments. This modest regulation results in lower
administrative costs, greater productivity, less dependence on
state appropriated dollars and better fund-raising from non-state

168.

Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957) (Warren, C.J., concur-

ring).
169. Novak, supra note 33, at 41.
170. Eykamp, supra note 27, at 101.
KERR & GADE, supra note 162, at 126. They support these contentions as
171.
follows: "All this is based on the conviction that a system of higher education based
One proof of this is the historical experion autonomy . . . will perform better ....
ence of the American system versus all others around the world." Id. at 127.
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sources. 172 A recent assessment of state higher education governance reforms found that a viable state governance system requires "legal standing (in the state constitution, if appropriate)
that will enable it to provide sustained, consistent, long-term
policy leadership in the face of increasing turnover and turbulence in state political leadership.' 7 3
5. Autonomous Board Accountability Safeguards
Perhaps the most persuasive argument advanced by public
board autonomy advocates is that these autonomous boards are
still subject to a great degree of state government limitation and
accountability despite their constitutional autonomy. 74 Autonomy proponents appear to make a compelling historical and sound
public policy case. The primary counter-arguments, at least partly contrary to their position, are set forth below.

172. See Reynolds, supra note 12, at 38-39 (analyzing J. FREDERICKS VOLKWEIN,
STATE REGULATION AND CAMPUS AUTONOMY 141-43 (1987).
173. Aims C. McGuinness, Jr., A Model for Successful Restructuring, in RESTRUCTURING HIGHER EDUCATION, supra note 34, at 215 (emphasis added). Perhaps worth
noting here is the fact that Dr. McGuinness served as ECS Policy Director for 18
years, is a leading scholar in the field of public higher education governance, and is
a member of the Colorado Board of State Colleges recently appointed by Governor
Romer.
Dr. Beckham reasons in favor of constitutional autonomy:
The advantage of placing broad constitutional powers exclusively in the
hands of the higher education governing board is that such a board, chosen
for long terms and reasonably independent of external state government
control, is likely to exhibit the qualities of understanding and experience
that will permit wise judgment in dealing with matters of educational
policymaking. The lay governing board thus becomes the link between the
higher education system and the society, preserving reasonable autonomy
for the system and adapting the system to meet changing social needs.
Beckham Dissertation, supra note 5, at 149-50.
174. Dr. Beckham observes:
[A] constitutionally autonomous higher education system could not abridge
rights protected by the federal or state constitution, and would be subject to
state legislation enforcing state-wide standards for public welfare, health
and safety ....
Ultimately, all constitutionally autonomous higher education systems are subject to some degree of state government limitation.
Beckham Dissertation, supra note 5, at vii, 151.
The Carnegie Commission, while praising maximum autonomy, wrote:
Autonomy, in the sense of full self-governance, does not now exist for American higher education, nor has it existed for a very long time, if ever. Autonomy is limited by the law, by the necessary influences and controls that
go along with financial support, and by public policy in areas of substantial
public policy concern. Autonomy in these areas is neither possible nor generally desirable.
CARNEGIE COMMISSION, supra note 35, at 17.
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B. Arguments FavoringLess Autonomy
In contrast to the volume of articles and studies which speak
in favor of public higher education board autonomy is the lack of
commentary which directly opposes or questions the board autonomy position. Those who challenge autonomy in general, or
autonomy in excess, do so subtly when they cite frustrations
with the higher education status quo or urge that public higher
education have more sensitivity to overall state policy needs.
Additional challenges are made on the basis that constitutional
or broad statutory autonomy may not be necessary in order to
protect academic freedom.
1. FrustrationWith Public Higher Education'sInability to Solve
Problems Effectively or Make Needed Changes
Elected political officials (including those in Montana who
supported C-30) do not warmly embrace the pro-autonomy arguments because they are frustrated with the perceived inability of
public higher education to resolve long-standing problems.17 5
Primary causes for this frustration include the following: (1) the
increase in state costs, including the increased cost for public
higher education, with a corresponding cut in federal matching
funds; 76 (2) the changing political climate in most states as
legislators oppose new or increased taxes to pay for social services, including public higher education; (3) state government
reinvention and reduction, which often poses the greatest difficulty for the structure and growth of public systems and campuses; (4) ongoing, self-generated public campus and system restructuring which is frequently not justified by any noticeable substantial program improvement or cost savings; and (5) erosion of
public confidence in higher education arising from news controversies.'77 Autonomous (and even less autonomous) governing

175.
"As we move into the latter half of the 1990's and prepare for the twentyfirst century, the relationship of public higher education to state government appears
to be more uncertain and in greater flux than ever before." Novak, supra note 33, at
27.
176.
This describes the changed fiscal climate in most states now. States are
facing costly new program needs in areas such as medicaid and prisons with fewer
federal matching funds available to help meet them, at a time when public higher
education costs also keep rising for states and students alike.
177.
These controversies include sports cheating, indirect research cost abuses,
antitrust price-fixing suits involving campuses on a national level plus individual
state scandals such as the one involving criminal corruption convictions of various
Texas A & M governing board members and high level administrators. See Novak,
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boards tend to bear the brunt of all of these criticisms.
2. The Need for More State Involvement in Higher Education
Decision-making on Public Policy Grounds
Commentators have articulated seemingly sound reasons for
more state government involvement in public system and campus activity at board expense. These arguments are based on the
desires of governors and legislative leaders to play greater roles
in formulating essential state public higher education policies.
Dr. Newman states that these views "stem from legislative frustration over institutional accountability to the state, responsiveness to public or political demands, or a perceived disregard for
satisfaction of student 'customers.'" 78 Collective state officials'
frustration and inability over how to do so undoubtedly contributes to their anti-autonomy sentiment.
Dr. Reynolds also describes a number of objections that state
elected officials have to public board autonomy. He cites as the
most common of these the argument that "the nature and scope
of all of higher education is a matter of public policy, and therefore should be the responsibility of the governor and the legislature."179 Autonomy opponents further believe that "[c]omplete
autonomy... ignores the legitimate interest of the public which
the university is meant to serve.""8 Those urging more state
government control over their campuses do so on the assumptions that: (a) because the state plays a major role in funding
supra note 33, at 27-28; Bruce Tomaso, '96 Tears . . . and Laughs, DALLAS MORNING
NEwS, Dec. 29, 1996, at 43A_ See also Paul Burka, Behind the Lines: Not Guilty,
TEXAS MONTHLY, Apr. 1997, at 7 (analyzing the Texas A & M scandal).
178.
Novak, supra note 33, at 39.
Dr. Newman writes:
The state role is essential. Not only is the state an essential force for accountability and for the assurance that the university will meet the public
interest, but it is clear from the history of American higher education that
external forces are essential to encourage change within the university.
Often, the most important changes have come about because of state or
federal action. We need, therefore, a strong but appropriate role.
NEWMAN, supra note 165, at 11. Finally, he notes:
Although a significant degree of independence is essential, a constructive
relationship recognizes the need for a system of checks and balances ....
The [public] university ...
needs the involvement of the state as a force
for meeting the public's needs, as a force for change and as a force for accountability. The problem, therefore, is not to eliminate the state's role, but
to perfect it.
Id. at 8.
179. Reynolds, supra note 12, at 29.
180. Id. at 30.
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public campuses it is entitled to control other aspects as well; (b)
public campus are "central to the life" of a state and nation and
thus require greater public control; and (c) public campuses institutions are not really very unique when compared to other state
agencies, and thus do not merit any special governance considerations."' 1 One of Montana's principal constitutional autonomy
advocates, whose 1971 work influenced the eventual creation of
Montana's Board of Regents in 1972, acknowledged:
Although the informal influence of legislators is subject to
abuse, it can be very beneficial in terms of keeping regents and
university administrators aware that legislators have a legitimate interest in university affairs and that legislators must be
informed with regard to university affairs to properly
deter82
mine the appropriate level of funds [for campuses].
In other words, few seem to doubt that it is necessary and
desirable for state political officials to be involved in public higher education policy formulation or decision-making. However,
there is little consensus over the specifics of how this should be
done.
3. Academic Freedom and Board Autonomy Separation
As already noted, principles of academic freedom protection
have directly shaped autonomy proponent arguments and even
provided much of their foundation. However, it is worth noting
that not all proponents view autonomy as essential to meeting
this need. The Carnegie Commission has written:
[The argument] that academic freedom ... depends on institutional independence has been sharply questioned by higher
education experts generally supportive of such independence
who have noted that academic freedom... can be substantial
although the university is essentially an arm of the state. Nor
has academic freedom ... suffered because of the recent decline
in campus independence .... [A]cademic freedom may exist in
the absence of substantial campus independence if supported by
the law and by public opinion.'

181. Id. at 33. Moreover, Dr. Reynolds writes: "State legislators may perceive
excess and waste in higher education. Waste is interpreted by state government as
money spent on a program or on behalf of a principle that no longer holds high
priority for the larger society. As a result, the state moves in with controls to reorder priorities." Id. at 34.
182. Waldoch, supra note 126, at 97.
183. CARNEGIE COMMISSION, supra note 35, at 22.
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The federal courts, and increasing numbers of state courts,
have affirmatively found constitutional protections against interference with public campus employee speech rights. In so doing,
these courts recognize that faculty in particular "have considerable freedom to express themselves on public issues and, as
private citizens, to associate with whom they please and engage
in outside activities of their choice."'" Those who are skeptical
of this contemporary judicial willingness to protect free speech
and academic freedom rights on campuses should simply review
recent cases." Although tenuous, the link these legal
protections suggest between constitutional public board autonomy and constitutionally protected speech is evident.
C. Arguments Used During the C-30 Campaign
Before the election, Montana C-30 proponents and opponents
advanced most of the arguments cited above to support their
respective positions. The "No on 30 Committee," formed to oppose the measure, argued forcefully that C-30 would shift public
higher education governance "from a citizen board whose authority comes from the constitution to a bureaucracy whose authority
comes from the legislature."' The Committee made the following observations: (1) the Legislature's failure to adopt the 1994
Task Force proposal for a single public education governing
board would cause less rather than more public education resource coordination; (2) the discretionary powers granted to the
Legislature to make core higher education decisions were overly
broad; and (3) creating a new education agency dependent on the
Governor was but a new form of bureaucracy.'87
C-30 proponents likened the Montana Board of Regents'
power to set tuition and fees to a power of taxation without accountability. They argued that the elected officials on the Board
had an excuse to avoid aggressive public campus cost-cutting."s Legislator proponents argued against what they saw as

184. W. KAPLIN & B. LEE, THE LAW OF HIGHER EDUCATION 328 (3d ed. 1995).
185. See Cohen v. San Bernardino Valley College, 92 F.3d 968 (9th Cir. 1996)
(invalidating public campus sexual harassment policy used to punish certain classroom professor lectures); Gay Lesbian Bisexual Alliance v. Sessions, 917 F. Supp.
1548 (M.D. Ala. 1996) (invalidating Alabama state laws which barred gay rights
advocates from speaking at public campuses).
186. The No on 30 Committee, 1 (May 23, 1996) (on file with author).
187. See id. at 2-4.
188. See Montana Governor's Budget Director Dave Lewis, Make Regents Ac-
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a lack of gubernatorial and legislative control over university
system budget policies, proposing that a governor and legislature
would be more accountable to citizens than a lay board."s At
the same time, these legislator proponents seemed to argue that
the real problem of the lack of accountability resulted from the
lack of one unified board responsible for all of Montana public
education and directly dependent on the governor (a situation C30 would not have remedied). 9 '
The Montana C-30 public debate was limited. With only one
exception, the debate relied solely on anecdotal Montana information and arguments rather than broad legal or policy arguments based on how Montana universities would compare with
others states in the United States if C-30 were enacted.1 9' Given C-30's large margin of defeat, opponents obviously did not
need these latter arguments.
V.

OTHER CONCERNS APPLICABLE To NON-AUTONOMOUS PUBLIC
BOARDS:ACCREDITATION, EDUCATION QUALITY AND LEGAL
INSTABILITY

A. Accreditation Issues and Concerns Arising From Lack of
Board Autonomy
The need for institutional accreditation by any state's public
campuses is straightforward and unequivocal. Although the
decision to seek accreditation remains the voluntary choice of
each college and university, as a practical matter, accreditation
is today a necessity for post-secondary institutions for two fundamental reasons: First, federal financial aid awards to institutions
and students is usually contingent upon accreditation; Second,
the reputation of an institution, and consequently its ability to
operate92successfully, can be adversely affected by lack of accredi1
tation.

countable, GREAT FALLS TRIBUNE, Mar. 29, 1996 at AS.
189. See "For C-30" Statement by Montana Senator John Hertel and Montana
Representative H. S. "Sonny" Hanson (undated). Hertel and Hanson sponsored House
Bill 229 (which became C-30) in the 1995 Legislature.
190. See id.
191. An exception may have been this author's C-30 "White Paper" which circulated throughout Montana during the election and serves as the basis for this article.
See David Aronofsky, Proposed Constitutional Amendment 30 To Eliminate The Montana Board Of Regents: An Analysis Within U.S. Public Higher Education Governance And Montana University System Historical Contexts (Oct. 1996) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author).
192. 1 JAMEs A. RAPP, EDUCATION LAW 3-127 (1996). Institutional accreditation
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Because public higher education accreditation is naturally
institutional rather than systemwide, accreditation standards
require that each institution within a state's system be governed
by a legally autonomous lay board with prescribed decision-making powers which are not susceptible to constant change by a
state's executive or legislative branch. Such boards can govern
single institutions or entire state systems, but their legal powers
must meet accreditation standards and requirements. These
standards and requirements also safeguard academic freedoms
on individual campuses by mandating that there be governing
boards, empowered to provide and protect them from external
political pressures.
Most public campuses have little difficulty obtaining or
maintaining accreditation regardless of whether their governance
structures enjoy constitutional or merely statutory status under
their respective state laws. However, this accreditation status
remains contingent upon legally autonomous lay boards (which
cannot be overly dependent on state executive or legislative
branch interference with board powers). As discussed more fully
below, C-30 threatened creation of a successor to the Montana
Board of Regents, the Commission on Education, which would be
little more than a non-governing advisory arm to a
gubernatorially appointed education department head serving at
the discretionary pleasure of the governor. Such a scheme could
well have jeopardized Montana's public university accreditation
status. Moreover, the history of other state accreditation experiences (plus at least once in Montana) teaches that public boards
can result in egregious political abuses posing serious accreditation problems. These accreditation concerns will require very
close scrutiny if C-30 proponents try again for similar future
public campus governing board changes.
1. Accreditation Requirements Applicable to Montana
The Northwest Association of Schools and Colleges of the
Commission on Colleges (Northwest Association), which accredits
all Montana postsecondary education institutions, appears to
have standards and requirements typical of the other five United
States regional accreditation associations.'93 Northwest Associshould be distinguished from individual academic programs accreditation, since the
latter would ostensibly be less affected by C-30's potential encroachment into public
higher education board decision-making. Legal stability in today's complex U.S. higher education environment and litigious society seems increasingly absent.
193. "Institutional accreditation is granted by six regional agencies - membership
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ation accreditation provisions related to issues of governance and
autonomy mandate "a governing board which has the authority
to carry out the mission of the institution... " and a campus
with "a high degree of intellectual independence of its faculty
and students. ...

""' Accreditation Standard VIII states: "The

governing board should... act as a body politic, not be subject
to pressures (state, political or religious) and should protect the
institution from the same."'95 The Northwest Association reinforces its autonomy requirement by stating: "Relating to this
general concern corresponding to intellectual and academic freedom are correlative responsibilities. On the part of the trustees
and administrators, there is the obligation to protect faculty and
students from inappropriate pressures or destructive harassments."'1 The Northwest Association also requires that institutions adhere to their principles and recognize a need for a governing board which recognizes its duty to the public and to protect the institution against outside influences.'97
The Northwest Association likewise imposes explicit governing board fiscal powers on states as accreditation conditions.19

associations composed of the accredited institutions in each region." KAPLIN & LEE,
supra note 184, at 873. The Northwest Association includes all accredited higher
education institutions in Alaska, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, Utah and Washington. See NORTHWEST ASSOCIATION OF SCHOOLS AND COLLEGES, COMMISSION ON
COLLEGES, ACCREDITATION HANDBOOK 2 (1994) [hereinafter ACCREDITATION HANDBOOK].
194. ACCREDITATION HANDBOOK, supra note 193, at 3, 7.
195. Id. at 73 (emphasis added). The Northwest Association explains in some
detail how it applies these standards and requirements in assessing accreditation:
The maintenance and exercise of... institutional integrity postulates and
requires appropriate autonomy and freedom. Put positively, this is the freedom to examine data, to question assumptions, to be guided by evidence, to
teach what one knows - to be a learner and a scholar. Put negatively, this
is a freedom from unwarranted harassment which hinders or prevents a ...
university from getting on with its essential work ....
A college or university is an institution of higher learning. Those within it have as a first
concern evidence and truth rather than particularjudgments of institutional
benefactors, concerns of churchmen, public opinion, social pressure, or political proscription.
Id. at 126 (emphasis added).
196. Id. at 128. "All concerned with the good of the ...
universities will seek
for ways to support their institutional integrity and the exercise of their appropriate
autonomy and freedom. In particular, the regional commissions . . . will always give
serious attention to this aspect and quality of institutional life so necessary for its
well-being and vitality." Id. (emphasis added).
197. Id. at 131.
198.
"The governing board . .. must control the institution's budget . . . . Unless the governing board has control of the budget, it cannot complete its planning
function or ensure implementation of its plans." Id. at 134.
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The Northwest Association explains the nature of public board
fiscal powers as follows:
When an institution depends for its support on an external
[public] agency.., the external agency will determine the
amount of support it will provide and may appropriately indicate in broad terms the categories for which support is provided.... The external agency should not, through line items,
control or other means, determine in detail how the funds are
to be spent. This is a function of the governing board and the
institution's officers. 99
Such detailed board fiscal powers requirements appear on their
face to limit how much governors, state budget offices and legislatures can dictate public campus finances at board expense
without placing accreditation in serious jeopardy.
One final Northwest Association accreditation development
requires discussion here. In December 1995, the Commission on
Colleges approved for future Northwest Association use a new
accreditation standard, Standard 8.B, which expressly augments
governing board responsibilities and powers requirements. Standard 8.B is likely to be effective by 2001 (the year in which C-30
would have gone into effect had it received voter approval). Standard 8.b states:
The governing board is ultimately responsible for the quality
and integrity of the institution (or institutions in the case of the
multi-unit system). It selects a chief executive officer; considers
and approves the mission of the institution; is concerned with
the provision of adequate funds; and exercises broad-based
oversight to ensure compliance with institutional policies. The
board establishes broad institutional policies and delegates to
the chief executive officer the responsibility to implement and
administer... [them].2 °
This new Standard seems clearly aimed at emphasizing that
public governing boards, rather than state elected officials or
their appointees serving at political discretion, must have responsibility and legal authority to exercise that responsibility
over a state's campuses. Standard 8.B also matches the overall
philosophy of the new Northwest Association requirements,
which expressly provides that "accreditation ... is intended
199. Id.
200.
NORTHWEST ASSOCIATION OF SCHOOLS AND COLLEGES, COMMISSION ON COLLEGES, INTERIM EDITION ACCREDITATION HANDBOOK 55 (Feb. 1996) [hereinafter INTERIM EDITION ACCREDITATION HANDBOOK].
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to... protect institutions against encroachments which might
jeopardize their educational effectiveness or academic free2
dom. ol
It must be emphasized that neither the Northwest Association nor any other United States post-secondary institution accreditation entity dictates what legal form of governance a state
should take. Additionally, no accreditation standards require
creation of constitutionally autonomous boards, provided that the
statutory powers conferred on such boards parallel those cited
above. C-30 appeared to propose a new Education Commission,
wholly dependent on a gubernatorially appointed Education
Department head and on the Montana Legislature to define all
commission and new department powers by statute. Thus, it is
unclear whether the new department head could have exercised
any meaningful powers over Montana's campuses or the Commission on Education without placing accreditation at risk. One
must assume that if C-30 had been adopted, Montana's governor
and legislature would have acted responsibly to avert accreditation problems by giving the Commission strong statutory powers
(perhaps with campus president executive powers) and legal
autonomy from the Governor's office. If history is any reliable
guide, no responsible Montana governor or legislature would
ever wish to see in Montana what happened in the southern
states, as described below.
2. Accreditation Turmoil in Dixie: Southern Association Experiences with Public Board Autonomy Infringement
Dr. Delgado writes a compelling story of how various southern state governors and legislatures either cost or nearly cost
their respective public campuses accreditation because of excessive political meddling in core campus governance functions. °
Well-known political historical figures such as Long, Bilbo and
Talmadge factor prominently in this story. Although the Southern Association of Colleges and Schools (Southern Association)
rather than its Northwest Association counterpart serves as Dr.
Cintron's focus, Montana's own history of political and financial
interference with public campus activities brings the collective
southern experience close to home. Perhaps the greatest historical significance of these southern experiences is how the voters

201.
202.

Id. at 1.
See Delgado, supra note 22.
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in some states so adversely affected by political intrusions, took
drastic action when faced with actual or threatened public campus accreditation loss. The voters of these states threw incumbent governors out of office; approved constitutional changes
creating autonomous governing boards with powers similar to
Montana's Board of Regents; and permanently solved their problems.
The southern accreditation saga began in 1930, with a
Southern Association investigation of complaints that Governor
Bilbo's dispute with the University of Mississippi chancellor
caused Mississippi's public campuses to drop scores of faculty
and administrators without warning, official written charges, or
any modicum of due process." 3 These faculty and administrators were fired soon after Governor Bilbo packed the Board of
Trustees of the state's public campuses with political cronies. His
actions triggered accreditation suspension at all the campuses
after the Southern Association found the Board "outside the
category of educational bodies" which were required to keep
accreditation. Reinstatement occurred only after Sennett Conner,
who defeated Governor Bilbo two years later, promised the
Southern Association he would reorganize the Board with members serving long staggered terms.2 '
203. See id. at 76-78.
204. See id. Urging the Association to return accreditation, Governor Conner
wrote:
In the first place, the wholesale dropping of officers and teachers of our
educational institutions brought forth immediately a storm of protest from
an outraged citizenship and from the press within the state of Mississippi.
Our people were indignant and deeply humiliated, but they were powerless
until August, 1931. Then, in the Democratic Primaries which followed a
campaign in which taking the University and colleges out of politics was
one of the major issues, they condemned and repudiated this action and
overwhelmingly defeated practically every candidate who sought to palliate
or justify it.
Id. at 79 (quoting Governor Sennett Conner in SOUTHERN ASSOCIATION PROCEEDINGS
36 (1931)). The Southern Association restored accreditation only after finding that
"the educational situation in...
Mississippi has undergone radical changes; a new
method of government has been devised for all ...
institutions, and a new
Board . . . selected." Id.
The Association returned to Mississippi in 1946 to excoriate Mississippi's Board
of Trustees for summarily dismissing the University of Mississippi Chancellor. See id.
at 105. Although the Association did
not fimd that the Board . . . failed to act within the scope of its legal power, nevertheless the manner by which the . . . [Chancellor] was dismissed
was of a nature which the Commission deplores. The Commission further
deplores the evidence of instability in the legal control of the University
which seems significantly to be manifested by the lapse of more than half
of a century since the head of this University has vacated the office by his

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1997

53

Montana Law Review, Vol. 58 [1997], Iss. 2, Art. 2

386

MONTANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58

The Southern Association's next accreditation dispute occurred in Louisiana in 1934, after Governor Huey Long persuaded the Louisiana State University (LSU) Board of Supervisors to
award a degree to a gubernatorial friend over faculty objection. °5 The Southern Association placed LSU on probation until the Board adopted new policies which required: (1) faculty
approval of all degrees; (2) LSU presidential appointment of all
LSU employees; and (3) the Board "to resist all types of outside
interference with curricula or extracurricular activities" while
empowering the President "to use the authority of [the] office
and all legal powers of this Board to protect in every legal
way... the University from such interference."2 " In 1935, the
Southern Association placed another Louisiana public college
governed by a different board on probation for several years until
that board adopted reasonable tenure policies to keep Governor
Long from meddling in faculty appointments.2 7 These problems
paved the way for Louisiana's 1940 constitutional amendment,
similar to Montana's 1972 change, which granted full legal autonomy for all public boards.
Georgia saw the next Southern Association accreditation
controversy after Governor Eugene Talmadge tried to manipulate the 1941 Georgia University System Board of Regents to fire
a University of Georgia's Education Dean who supported integration.2" The Southern Association threatened to revoke accreditation of all ten public campuses governed by the Board because
the Board was incapable of making decisions free of political
pressure and several state statutes gave the governor complete
power over the university's budget."M The Southern Association
own voluntary action.
Id. at 105 (citing SOUTHERN ASSOCIATION MINUTES 5 (1946)). This incident revealed

accreditation concerns about "actual as well as potential governance infringements"
regardless of whether the board decisions at issue complied with applicable state
laws. Id. at 105-06.
205. See id. at 89-90.
206.

Id. at 90-91 (citing SOUTHERN ASSOCIATION PROCEEDINGS 35-36 (1935)).

207. See id. at 91-92.
208. See id. at 102-04.
209. See id. at 102. The Association found:
In light of all the evidence ... the University System of Georgia has been
the victim of unprecedented and unjustifiable political interference; that the
Governor of the State has violated not only sound educational policy, but
proper democratic procedure in insisting upon the resignation of members of
the Board of Regents in order to appoint . . . men who would do his bid-

ding; that the Board of Regents has flagrantly violated sound educational
procedure in dismissals and appointments of staff members; that every
institution in the System is profoundly affected by the precedents estab-
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withdrew its threat after the Georgia Legislature corrected the
legal conditions that triggered the threat and after Governor
Talmadge "lost the gubernatorial election to Ellis Arnall whose
platform pledged to depoliticize the higher education system."21° That same year Georgia voters also approved a state
constitutional amendment creating Georgia's presently autonomous Board of Regents. This board has seen no major accreditation problem since then.
The Southern Association suspended Morehead State Teachers College accreditation in Kentucky when that institution's
governing board, whose members could be dismissed at gubernatorial whim, refused to block the governor's firing of the College
President.2 ' Accreditation remained revoked until 1948, after
Governor-elect Clements personally appeared in 1947 to plead
for reinstatement with a promise that he would secure enactment of a new law making it much more difficult to oust campus
board members and administrators, and after he made good on
this promise a year later.2 The Southern Association also
adopted new governance standards and requirements during this
period which closely resemble the ones presently used by the
Northwest Association as cited above.213
The Southern Association returned to Mississippi in
1962 to investigate reports that the Board of Trustees was relinquishing power to Governor Barnett in response to University of
lished; that there can be no effective educational program where this condition exists; that in view of its (the Board of Regents) dependence upon the
concurrence of the Governor in matters vital to the operation of the System,
the Board. . . does not appear to be an independent and effective educational Board of Control.
Id. at 103 (quoting ASSOCIATION QUARTERLY 314 (1942)) (emphasis added).
210. Id. at 103.
211. See id. at 115-19.
212. See id. at 115-19.
213. See id. at 110-12. Kentucky encountered much more serious difficulties in
1950, when the Association almost rescinded accreditation for all of the state's public
campuses following enactment of a law that same year giving the State Finance
Department and Governor "the power to stipulate the salaries and responsibilities of
state employees" including those at.public campuses. Id. at 140-41. The Association
stated:
deprive the Boards of Trustees and Regents
These statutory provisions ...
of their control of the institutions of higher education by taking from them
the power and authority to administer the affairs of their institutions. Such
legislation is a violation of... [Association] principles . . . and is in conflict with its constitution and standards.
Id. at 141 (quoting SOUTHERN ASSOCIATION PROCEEDINGS 152 (1950)). This crisis resolved itself only after the 1952 election of a new governor who secured annulment
of the 1950 law. Id.
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Mississippi desegregation activity.2 14 The Southern Association
found these allegations generally accurate, but chose not to revoke accreditation right away because of the situation's volatility.2" 5 Instead, the Southern Association placed the University
on a "watch" and warned state officials that accreditation could
be lost by any weakening of Board powers or attempts to influence educational freedom.2 16 Fortunately, the University of Mississippi situation resolved itself, the Southern Association was
satisfied within weeks, and no further accreditation violations occurred in that state.217
Another accreditation controversy involved Florida's public
campuses in the mid-1960s. The Southern Association targeted
Florida's campus line item appropriations bill practices by the
legislature, as a major violation of new Southern Association
finance standards.2 1 s The Southern Association also expressed
grave concern about State Budget Commission controls over
campus faculty appointments and overall governing board autonomy.219 The Southern Association nonetheless refrained from
accreditation revocation pending the outcome of a 1965 special
election that resulted in the creation of a more autonomous
Board of Regents and a chancellor to govern the Florida system
who was given broad statutory powers by the legislature.22
This appeared to resolve Southern Association problems in Florida and no adverse accreditation action occurred.2 21

The final Southern Association accreditation conflict reviewed here occurred at University of North Carolina (UNC) in
1963, where the North Carolina Legislature passed "An Act to

214. See id. at 161-67.
215. See id. at 166-67.
216. This included
any encroachment by pressure groups, investigating committees or other
agencies, as judged by normal standards, upon the freedom of the faculty,
the administration, or the students to learn and teach;" or by "any manipulation of appropriation bills as a punitive measure or as undue influence
upon internal operations of the institutions or any of them ....
Id. 161-67.
217. See id.
218. See id. at 167-83.
219. See id. Like Montana before 1972, a weak Board of Control with little legal
authority administered Florida's public universities and this Board could not meet
Association governance standards. The Association informed the state: "No educational institution is properly administered nor can it conduct a sound educational program when any agency or officer other than the controlling board, the president, and
business officer exercises financial control." Id. at 171.
220. See id. at 170-71.
221. See id.
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Regulate Visiting Speakers at State Supported Colleges and
Universities."22 2 The Act banned speakers who were either
Communists or advocates of overthrowing the United States
government. Enforcement of the Act invoked opposition from
board members, administrators, faculty, and students from all
over the state. The UNC's president requested the Southern
Association refrain from adverse accreditation action pending
proposed legislative repeal in 1965.2' When the state's new
governor proved unable or unwilling to meet these concerns in
mid-1965, the Southern Association initiated accreditation revocation steps. 2 This caused the Governor to appoint a Speaker
Ban Study Commission and later that year the legislature enacted a new law "returning the power to regulate speakers on
campus to the board."2" North Carolina's problems ended,
along with other major Southern Association problems involving
public board autonomy infringement by the states.22
The Southern Association experiences illustrate important
lessons, beginning with the necessity for any state that contemplates public board legal changes to first carefully consider accreditation standards and rules. No state has the unfettered
legal right to create whatever public campus or governance system it wishes without risking accreditation loss. It is not merely
coincidental that the more legally autonomous southern state
public boards became, the less frequently these states encountered accreditation problems.2 27

222. Id. at 183.
223. See id at 183-84. The Association nevertheless announced its intent to consider accreditation revocation at all campuses if this did not occur:
Insofar as the act removes from the governing boards of state institutions
of higher learning in North Carolina their traditional authority to handle
such matters with administrative discretion, it raises an issue of interference with the necessary authority of the board. A governing board must
protect the integrity of the colleges ....
For this responsibility it requires
commensurate authority....
Id. at 184 (quoting SOUTHERN ASSOCIATION PROCEEDINGS 64-65 (1965)).
224. " See id. at 184.

225.

Id. at 184-85.

226. See id. at 185.
227. Whether such autonomy resulted from constitutional or statutory change
may not seem too important at first glance, but once Louisiana and Georgia decided
to adopt full constitutional autonomy, they had no further problems. This parallels
the public higher education situation in Montana, where problems caused by undue
political interference and a weak governing board disappeared with the autonomous
Board of Regents' 1972 creation.
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B. Academic Quality and Public Board Autonomy Relationships
The relationship between academic quality and governing
board autonomy in United States public higher education has
just recently started to receive scholarly attention. Dr. Eykamp's
1995 study promises further work in this field, however, since
his assessment of forty-three United States public research universities found that "constitutional autonomy has a statistically
significant effect on quality equal to a four standard deviation
increase in state appropriations to the university; alternatively, a
two standard deviation increase in total resources, including
federal grants and contracts."" He further found that "political
insulation for university governing boards provides large gains in
university quality at no additional expense to the state.""
These findings have great potential significance for state governments seeking new corporate investment dollars, since businesses frequently base such investment decisions in large part on
whether the locations they invest in have high quality, researchoriented universities; sizable portions of these new corporate
dollars find their way into campus coffers.23 °
To explain his findings and conclusions, Dr. Eykamp reasons
that constitutionally autonomous boards have more insulation

228. Eykamp, supra note 27, at xvi.
229. Id.
230. See id. at 157-61. Dr. Eykamp's quality measurement indicia include.those
most often used in evaluating higher education institutions, including: (a) number
and impact of faculty publications in relevant academic fields; (b) percentage of faculty who publish; (c) percentage of faculty who obtain federal grants; (d) the number of
graduate students with definite job commitments at Ph.D. granting campuses; and (e)
the number of undergraduates who ultimately receive terminal degrees. See id. at
137. He weighs federal research funds generation as key among these factors, since
most federal dollars go to campuses based on merit and quality reflected in competitively bid awards. See id. at 161-62. Appendix 2 of this article ranks his qualitative
winner institutions; and the list reveals that constitutionally autonomous boards
govern most of the high quality U.S. campuses. Dr. Eykamp's quality rankings do
not appear inconsistent with those seen in America's Best Colleges, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REPORT, Sept. 18, 1995, at 126-31, which generally rates the best U.S. private universities much higher than their public institution counterparts (at least
arguably in part because of private board autonomy from state political interference).
Among the most highly rated public campuses in the latter, flagship universities
governed by constitutionally autonomous boards tend to score somewhat higher as a
group than the others, although the University of Virginia (a statutory maximum
autonomy campus) is the highest rated public campus of all. Also worth noting is
heavy U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT reliance on both low student attrition and
reputational quality nationally as key factors in its rating system, at least partly
supporting the theory linking governing board autonomy and reputational quality. See
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from direct political control and interference.2 3 This, in turn,
materially enhances campus quality by improving reputation,
increasing research output, and generating more research dollars.2 32 He also finds that constitutionally autonomous campuses receive four times as many state appropriated dollars and
twice as many overall dollars, while non-autonomous campuses
receiving higher state appropriations do not see material quality
improvements.' Finally, he dispels notions that research universities governed by autonomous boards short-change teaching
with his finding that autonomous campuses spend more on instruction in virtually all fields.'
Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, Dr. Eykamp found no significant relationship between academic quality and board autonomy over core fiscal or management functions such as: (1) personnel hiring and staff development; (2) budget pre-audits and
post-audits; (3) purchasing; or (3) managing external grant, contract and gift revenues.' This may be best explained, however,
by noting that no single one of these functions has as much significance as the presence or absence of a constitutional board to
make and direct the most important institutional decisions free
of political interference. Dr. Newman's earlier work which assessed the relationship between public campus autonomy and
academic quality also concluded: "Although there appears to be a
close relationship between the autonomy and flexibility accorded
a public university by the state and the quality of that university, it is difficult to prove. This relationship eludes quantitative
measurement, yet it is widely acknowledged." 236
Dr. Eykamp expands the knowledge base about these issues,
and more work is yet to be done regarding their implications.
The Eykamp work quantitatively validates the theory, previously
articulated by Dr. Newman, that public governing board freedom
from political interference directly improves educational
quality." 7 Former New Jersey Republican Governor Thomas

231. See Eykamp, supra note 27, at 260.
232. See id. at 261.
233. See id. at 260-61.
234. See id. at 262.
235. See id. at 263-64.
236. NEWMAN, supra note 165, at 9 (footnote omitted).
237. Dr. Newman stated:
[W]hen universities of quality are needed, as the Chinese, for example,
found after the Cultural Revolution, some buffering from the political system must be restored. The American approach has been to provide separation through a lay board of trustees and often through a legislated or con-
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Kean, a national higher education reform leader, told his legislature:
[A]cademics and statesmen have long recognized that one of the
guarantors of freedom itself is the freedom of inquiry which the
university must, by its very nature, espouse. It follows that the
autonomy of the university, i.e., its ability to govern itself and
to protect itself from external pressure and manipulation, is an
essential condition of its very existence. In fact, the institutional support of academic freedom is so important that... truly ... the academic community cannot be free if the institution
is not free.'
Governor Kean's remarks underscore the generally undisputed principle that autonomy assures better teaching, research and
service to the public, which in turn enhance reputational quality.
A strong autonomy advocate, Dr. Newman believes that states
must aspire to have high quality public higher education before
they can attain it-but, then laments that the
aspiration to have high quality universities is absent in... at
least half of the states [because some] seem afraid of having a
great university for fear that it will become a political threat or
an expensive habit; [while others] simply do not believe...
they have within themselves the ability to be first class.s
He also identifies three principal forms of intrusion which undermine autonomy and thus harm academic quality, including:
Bureaucratic intrusion---"overregulation of activities for reasons that are usually legitimate but by means that ultimately
interfere with the ability of the university to perform its function in a timely, efficient and creative manner" (fiscal
micromanagement by state budget officials, unsuitable nonacademic personnel policies, etc.)."4
Ideological intrusion--"the attempt to interfere with the affairs
of the university by preventing or insisting upon an activity

stitutional provision of autonomy.
Id. at 7.
238. Id. at 7-8 (quoting Governor Thomas H. Kean, Address to the New Jersey
State Legislature (Jan. 8, 1985)).
239. Id. He further observes: "Despite the difficulty of measurement, one can say
with certainty that those universities ranked at the high quality end have . . . an
effective relationship with their state that includes substantial flexibility. Conversely,
in those states where the relationship is poor, so always is university quality." Id. at
10 (emphasis added).
240. Id. at 23.
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strictly on ideological grounds," although this occurs as often
from within the university as from political pressure groups or
state officials." 1
Political intrusion-"interferencein a decision to enhance the
political interest of someone or some group in state government," such as patronage in obtaining campus jobs or contracts,
blocking administrator and board appointments, curriculum
mandates, etc.m
Dr. Newman expresses strong concern about intrusions by
state agency employees into public campus governance, which he
attributes to "the desire within the state bureaucracy to exercise
power."' Such sentiment may arguably reflect an attempt to
obtain more fiscal accountability. However, its adverse impact on
public campus quality should be obvious.
Dr. Newman raises yet another quality concern of particular
significance for states which opt for weak public governing
boards. "If, for example, the system leadership is overly sensitive
to the political winds, it will force the institution[s] to move in
directions that may be counterproductive, a condition all the
more dangerous because it comes from within the system."2
He recommends certain antidotes to ensure quality such as: "The
governor and legislators must support boards, chancellors and
presidents who take the risks inherent in building a great and
responsive university and analyze state actions to prevent unthinking disincentives to risk-taking."'
Assuming that Dr. Newman's recommendations are essential
for high quality public universities, it is not altogether clear that
C-30 would have supported any of them since its adoption would
have eliminated a governance structure which now encompasses
them all.2" These public interest considerations must necessar-

241. Id. at 24-26.
242. Id. at 27-31.
243. He cites one state budget director's remarks as graphic evidence: "I control
every position in the state, from laborer to director [of a state department], except
those in higher education. What makes the university think that it should escape?"
Id. at 49 (alteration in original).
244. Id. at 57.
245. Id. at 99. Other antidotes are: "[Cireate incentives to ensure needed decisions that should be made on campus are made there and resist the temptation to
make them by legislative mandate. Take clear steps to reduce unnecessary regulation
or cumbersome bureaucracy while defining more clearly campus responsibilities." Id.
246. One more point about the quality-autonomy relationship merits reflection.
An expert on U.S. public higher education governance changes in the past several
years recently wrote:
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fly shape any higher education governance system in any state.
C. Legal Stability Considerations
Constitutionally autonomous public higher education systems, institutions and boards tend to have greater legal stability
and certainty because "legal precedents which have established
the doctrine of constitutional autonomy could be relied on to
reduce the number of issues subject to litigation."24 7 Montana
public higher education has experienced these benefits since
1972 under the current Board of Regents. Only two cases related
to Board or campus power and authority have ever been filed
and seriously litigated during this time (although the case currently pending before the Supreme Court against the Land
Board as discussed below would be the third).2 48
Constitutionally autonomous systems, boards and institutions also tend to experience less litigation involving academic
freedom and free speech issues when boards exercise their authority responsibly. This is understandable because "numerous
[United States] Supreme Court decisions have heralded the
university's need for autonomy" from outside political interference. Furthermore, once public campuses obtain such autonomy

Citizens have a lot at stake in the way higher education is governed. It is
relatively easy to communicate the value of higher education's products, the
importance of quality programs offered at a tuition rate that students can
afford, and the need to provide a high level of access. In fact, the public
clearly grasps these basic facts ... [blut they do not often realize that an
effective governing system will help determine if those public goods are readily available. A dysfunctional or unstable system will not be able to advocate
effectively for the resources necessary to maintain quality programs required
by students in our knowledge-based economy. Nor will it lead, coordinate,
manage, or plan the future for ... universities in ways that enable these
institutions to serve the citizenry well in the long run.
Novak, supra note 33, at 16-17 (emphasis added).
247. Beckham Dissertation, supra note 5, at vii.
248. One case reflects 1975 Montana Supreme Court recognition of the Board as
constitutionally autonomous; and the second involves a complaint unsuccessfully litigated to date by a plaintiff challenging campus authority to rent space to outside
groups for revenue purposes. In contrast, the Montana Digest cites numerous legal
opinions addressing governing board powers questions before 1972. See, e.g., Brown v.
State Bd. of Educ., 142 Mont. 547, 385 P.2d 643 (1963); State ex rel. Phillips v.
Ford, 116 Mont. 190, 151 P.2d 190 (1944); State ex rel. Keeney v. Ayers, 108 Mont.
547, 92 P.2d 306 (1939); State ex rel. Dragsted v. State Bd. of Educ., 103 Mont. 336,
62 P.2d 330 (1936). The lack of such litigation since 1975 following judicial recognition of broad Board powers supports Professor Beckham's conclusion. Board of Regents v. Judge, 168 Mont. 433, 543 P.2d 1323 (1975); The Duck Inn, Inc. v. Montana
State Univ., DV-94-105, Montana Twelfth Judicial District Court, Hill County, appeal
dismissed by Montana Supreme Ct., No. 95-177 (Nov. 7, 1995).
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through constitutionally independent boards which are less susceptible to political pressure, the courts have less need to interfere to provide protection."' 9
Montana's public higher education history before the Board
of Regents was created in 1972 reveals more than 80 years of
legal instability and uncertainty over the extent to which a nonautonomous state Board of Education, charged with governing
the state's public campuses, had sufficient legal authority to
perform its responsibilities. As discussed above, no other state
has a public higher education governance model resembling the
one C-30 proposed. Thus Montana could not have learned from
other states how to avert legal uncertainties in advance.
Both Dr. Reynolds and Dr. Beckham have studied how public boards have floundered along with state courts and legislatures in trying to govern their campuses and systems responsibly
when they have had less than maximum autonomy and much
uncertainty over their powers. This has usually resulted in a
situation that is less than beneficial to the public interest.'
Montana's 1972 Constitution framers created the Board of Regents here to escape this fate, and also to reverse Montana's long
history of public higher education failures.
VI. WOULD C-30 HAVE WITHSTOOD A REALISTIC COST-BENEFIT

ANALYSIS?
A number of other states have substantially revised their
public higher education governance structures over the past
decade. These experiences are now being carefully studied to
determine if the costs of change have outweighed the benefits.
The conclusion is that: "[g]overnance restructuring can bring
about positive change in the long run. [B]ringing in new leaders
with broader authority [and] restructuring... brought about
changes that the prior regime would have resisted or lacked the
power to enforce." 1 However, governance changes "can be

249. Kelly Knivila, Public Universities and the Eleventh Amendment, 78 GEO. L.J.
1723, 1731-32 (1990).
250. See Beckham Dissertation, supra note 5; Reynolds, supra note 12. See also
James F. Shekleton, The Road Not Taken: The Curious Jurisprudence Touching Upon
the Constitutional Status of the South Dakota Board of Regents, 39 S.D. L. REv. 312,
403 (1994) (describing how South Dakota, which has a constitutionally established
public board subject to its state legislature's ambiguous statutory authority, has seen
this ambiguity expose the state's public campuses "to unrestricted political intervention in all aspects of their governance, irrespective of any effects on academic standards or practices.").
251. Terrence J. MacTaggart, Lessons for Leaders, in RESTRUCTURING HIGHER
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counterproductive and disruptive, distracting key parties from
the main purpose of higher education."25 2 Any new structure
must be created to "transcend the talents of particular lead2
ers." 5

Although the benefits of major governance changes in other
states are still being sought and assessed, the costs are already
beginning to be known. "Higher, not lower, costs are likely, at
least in the short run" based on changes made in Minnesota a
few years ago.2 " The costs of changes in Minnesota may not
have been identified until after the changes were legislatively
mandated. 2" The cost was measured in terms of the fiscal impact of personnel classifications, technical systems, lost opportunities, and even the large amounts of overtime and comp time
needed to discuss and implement the changes."6 A recent study
of major governance restructuring in Massachusetts, Alaska,
Maryland, Minnesota and North Dakota reveals that only North
Dakota has seen tangible benefits to date because of that state's
constitutionally independent Board of Higher Education and
history of "consistent strengthening of the authority of the
Board." 21 C-30, as proposed, had little relationship to this
North Dakota success formula. The other four states have yet to
see any discernible fiscal or educational improvements. Evidence
to date suggests more negative than positive consequences in
areas such as: political instability (Massachusetts), poor campus
personnel relations (Alaska), serious morale and implementation
problems (Minnesota), and needless political antagonism which
impeded the ability to achieve any discernible positive results
(Maryland).2 s
A more appropriate approach to analyzing governance
change costs and benefits is to ask some key questions about
what the leaders of the state seek to accomplish with the changes. Education Commission of the States (ECS) advises that before changing its governance system materially, a state must

EDUCATION: WHAT WORKS AND WHAT DOESN'T IN REORGANIZING
TEMS 235 (Terrence J. MacTaggart & Assocs. ed., 1996).

252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.

GOVERNANCE SYS-

Novak, supra note 33, at 41.

Id.
MacTaggart, supra note 251, at 233.
See id.
See id.
Douglas M. Treadway, Restructuring That Works: North Dakota, in RE-

STRUCTURING HIGHER EDUCATION: WHAT WORKS AND WHAT DOESN'T IN REORGANIZING

GOVERNANCE SYSTEMS 54 (Terrence J. MacTaggart & Assocs. ed., 1996).
258. See RESTRUCTURING HIGHER EDUCATION, supra note 33, at xiv-xv.
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assess all fiscal and policy implications. In addition, the state
should "clarify the state vision, goals and objectives for higher
education [because] reorganization without a sense of purpose or
direction may be more damaging than maintaining the status
quo."259 Montana's 1994 Task Force appeared to do little if any
of this in recommending Montana's educational restructuring.
This haphazard restructuring is condemned by Dr. MacTaggart
for not really improving the quality of education.2"
In addition, MacTaggart emphasizes that alternatives to
complete restructuring should be considered when determining
how to most effectively make improvements.26 1 States should be
especially careful that "[r]estructuring will [not] dominate the
academic landscape, interrupt current operations, and drive out
other worthwhile initiatives."262 Finally, Dr. MacTaggart cites
Edmund Burke's well-quoted maxim: "It is with infinite caution
that any man ought to venture upon pulling down an edifice
which has answered in any tolerable degree its intended social
purposes."
As required by Montana statute,"6 C-30 had a fiscal note
designed to "inform" voters about the likely fiscal impact of C-30
adoption. However, the note stated that "the actual fiscal impact
of this constitutional amendment cannot be determined at this
time, as it would depend upon a budget proposed by the governor
and approved by the legislature."2"
The absence of any viable cost analysis related to C-30
seems to weigh heavily against favoring C-30 in any rational
cost-benefit analysis when measured against the following: (1)
the successes of Montana's present system; (2) Montana's bleak
higher education history before 1972 which these successes have
reversed; (3) experiences in other states which have benefitted
from constitutional autonomy, while those without it have seen

259. HANDBOOK, supra note 6, at 38-39.
260.
"By itself, governance restructuring doesn't improve anything . . . . [O]ther
than altering careers and reconfiguring organizational charts, these changes do not in
themselves improve the quality of education or make the allotment of resources more
efficient or accomplish any other noble purpose." MacTaggart, supra note 251, at 23031.
261.
Based on his review of the changes in all five states listed above, Dr.
MacTaggart cautions: "Cheaper and less dramatic alternatives to restructuring should
be considered first . . . [because major restructuring] is expensive and time-consuming, and its probability of achieving intended outcomes is by no means assured." Id.
262. Id. at 232.
263. Id. at 235-36.
264. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-27-315 (1995).
265.
C-30 Fiscal Note, Montana Secretary of State.
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little gain to date from their own governance changes; (4) some
realistic accreditation risks in C-30's details; (5) emerging evidence linking quality higher education to constitutional autonomy; and (6) America's historical tradition of independent lay
board control in most public education policy-making decisions.
VII. NEW CHALLENGES TO REGENTS AUTONOMY DESPITE C-30
RESULTS
The C-30 election results should have put the issue of Montana Board of Regents constitutional autonomy soundly to rest in
favor of the Board. However, despite the proposed amendment's
landslide defeat, the Regents' autonomy faces a two-pronged
assault from legislators who proposed C-30 and did not like election results, and from the State Land Board which questions the
Board of Regents authority to engage in University System real
property transactions.
A. 1997 Legislative Attacks on Board of Regents Autonomy
Montana State Representative H.S. "Sonny" Hanson (the
House Republican Majority Leader who sponsored the 1995 legislation which became C-30), was interviewed the day after last
November's elections, and stated he did "not believe the vote
proves that the Regents are doing a good job and many voters
didn't fully understand the issue. " 66 After the 1997 Legislature
convened, he introduced House Bill 259, in concert with the
Office of Public Instruction, which required the Regents to submit a unified budget request and placed various spending restrictions on the Regents in connection with their legislatively appropriated funds."6 7
About one month into the 1997 session, a group of Republican legislators (most of whom had supported C-30) introduced
House Bill 500 requiring express statutory authorization for
public universities and other Montana state agencies to engage
in any activity which competed in any way with private enterprise. The bill which specifically targeted university research for
this restriction passed the Montana House but was tabled in
Senate Committee.2" Former House Minority Leader Ray Peck,
266. MONTANA KAImiN, Nov. 6, 1996, at A-1.
267. See H.B. 259, 55th Leg. (Mont. 1997).
268. See H.B. 500, 55th Leg. (Mont. 1997). Examples of University System campus activities not expressly authorized by Montana statute include virtually all University publications, such as the MONTANA LAW REVIEW and MONTANA KAIMIN; all
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the leading Democratic proponent of C-30 in the 1995 Legislature, introduced House Bill 344 imposing numerous new restrictions on Board of Regents power to sell or exchange real property
owned by the University System." 9 House Bill 344 sought to
expand the scope of another Peck bill enacted into law in 1995,
which also restricted Board of Regents power to sell or exchange
University System real property.270 After passing the House,
more or less intact, House Bill 344 underwent substantial Senate
revision and was reframed by the House in a manner far less
intrusive into Regent power. The 1995 law and newly enacted
House Bill 344, will likely receive close Montana Supreme Court
constitutional scrutiny in the Board of Regents lawsuit against
the Land Board discussed below. These bills reflect legislator
reluctance to accept the apparent C-30 election mandate to leave
the Board of Regents alone.
B. The Land Board Challenge to Board of Regents Autonomy
On January 6, 1997, the Montana Board of Regents filed
suit in the Montana Supreme Court against the Montana Land
Board seeking a declaratory judgment jurisdiction to resolve the
issue of whether the Land Board has the authority to review and
disapprove the Board of Regents' authority to sell or exchange
University System real property.27 ' The complaint seeks court
validation of some three dozen transactions that were approved
by the Regents (prior to the 1995 law) without Land Board review or approval. In addition, the complaint asks the court to
determine whether the Land Board has the constitutional power
to disapprove University System real property transactions despite the 1995 law requiring such approval.2 72 The suit follows

University System radio and television stations; most forms of research; legal clinics;
virtually all continuing education courses; many university continuing education
courses (which ostensibly compete with private, for-profit seminars); and even campus
athletic events. As with C-30, House Bill 500 reflects radical departure from any
other state's laws applicable to public university activity. Only three states have ever
enacted this type of legislation, and all provide ample authority for their respective
state governing boards to review and resolve such competition issues directly. See
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-275 (West 1996); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-113-102 to
-105 (West 1996); and IOWA CODE ANN. § 23A.1 to -23A.4 (West 1997).
269. See H.B. 344, 55th Leg. (Mont. 1997).
270. See MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 20-25-307, 308.
271. See Application for Original Jurisdiction; Petition for Declaratory Relief; and
Memorandum of Authorities, Board of Regents of Higher Educ. v. State Land Bd.,
No. 97-010 (Mont. Sup. Ct. filed Jan. 6, 1997).
272. See id. at 1-2.
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two years of controversy triggered when the University of Montana sold Fort Missoula to private developers. The result of the
dispute was based on an issued opinion by the Montana Attorney
General which held that the sale was invalid because it did not
follow certain statutory procedures applicable to other public
land sales. 73
Throughout the Fort Missoula controversy, the Board of
Regents maintained that it had the constitutional authority to
sell Fort Missoula land based on the 1972 Constitution granting
the Board its legal autonomy. In the end, the Board repurchased
the land without ever pressing the point in court." However,
following the repurchase, the Land Board asked the Attorney
General to review all University System land sales and exchanges approved by the Regents since 1973 and the Attorney General
concluded that all were likely illegal based upon the Regents'
alleged lack of authority to approve the transactions without
Land Board approval.2 75
The legal issues here appear especially complicated based
upon a 1980 Land Board disclaimer of jurisdiction over University System land transactions, and a 1994 Attorney General Report which contrasted with the 1997 Attorney General Report.
The 1994 Report suggested that the Regents had far greater
legal autonomy over all University System activity, including
real property transactions.2 7 6 The Board of Regent's lawsuit
against the Land Board relies heavily on the reliance created by
the 1980 disclaimer and also attacks the 1995 statute as unlawful encroachment on Regent constitutional authority to make
decisions in the University System's best interests. 7 The Land
Board's February 7, 1997 response vigorously contests the
Regents' legal position and the Montana Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to hear the case.27

273.
See OFFICE OF THE MONTANA ATTORNEY GENERAL, REPORT TO THE STATE
LAND BOARD: THE DISPOSITION OF PUBLIC LANDS BY THE MONTANA UNIVERSITY SYSTEM SINCE JUNE 6, 1972 50 (Feb. 20, 1996) (citing letter from Joseph P. Mazurek,

Montana Attorney General, to Board of Land Commissioners (Aug. 17, 1995)). The
Attorney General cited Article X, Section 11 of Montana's Constitution and Section
77-1-101 et seq. to support his position that all public lands were subject to Land
Board control and approval before they could be sold.
274. See id.
275. See id.; OFFICE OF THE MONTANA ATTORNEY GENERAL, REPORT TO THE
STATE LAND BOARD: LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE DISPOSITION OF PUBLIC LANDS BY THE
MONTANA UNIVERSITY SYSTEM (Apr. 15, 1996).
276. See Application for Original Jurisdiction, supra note 271, at Exhibits 1 & 2.
277. See id. at 12-15.
278. See Response to Application for Original Jurisdiction and Petition for De-
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The Montana Supreme Court will ultimately decide all the
issues raised in the Board of Regents v. Land Board unless the
parties settle. Any assessment of the merits here would be premature speculation. Review of this case simply serves to illustrate how both the Land Board and the Montana Legislature is
reluctant to recognize the authority of the Board of Regents to
continue what it has been doing since its 1972 creation without
legal or political objection--entering into land transactions. Such
reluctance suggests that, notwithstanding the decisive C-30 election results, the autonomy issue may remain polemic enough to
trigger future C-30 efforts. Should this occur, Montana must
then reconsider all the legal and policy issues disposed of when
the voters defeated C-30 last November. Current Montana statutes quite possibly offer a basis for resolving them.
VIII. FURTHER LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING
FUTURE

C-30 ADOPTION

Assuming Montana voters revisit and approve some future
type of C-30 proposal to limit Board of Regents powers, certain
legal precautions should be taken to mitigate the potential
harms cited above. For example, the four-year effective date
delay contained in C-30 seemed necessary to give Montana's
Governor, Legislature, and other state leaders time to plan the
transition. This transition time should be spent effectively with
the best interests of the state in mind. Careful attention should
be given to the specific legal structure to be used in governing
the University System.
If the Montana leaders opt not to return to the previously
failed pre-1972 system, but instead implement a new structure,
this structure would have to meet one core pre-requisite for any
new non-constitutional governance structure adopted-accreditation standards. Accreditation standards require
strict adherence to the requirement that there be a legally autonomous board with maximum statutory protections from legislative and executive branch interference (with core university
governance powers). At a minimum, these powers would require
that any non-constitutional governing board have statutory authority to: (a) make all significant budget and spending decisions, including those related to employee compensation, student
fees and campus categorical spending; (b) initiate and defend
claratory Relief, Board of Regents of Higher Educ. v. State Land Bd., No. 97-010
(Mont. Sup. Ct. Feb. 7, 1997).
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against lawsuits, consistent with accreditation mandates that
governing boards have sufficient power to protect their campuses
from external pressures; (c) appoint all campus chief executive
officers, as well as grant final approval to all campus personnel
appointments unless this is delegated to the campuses themselves; and (d) set all academic policies affecting curriculum and
degrees.
Montana Code Title 20, Chapter 25 appears at initial glance
to provide an ample statutory basis for meeting most accreditation concerns with relatively little change if any new board were
given the same statutory powers presently afforded the Montana
Board of Regents. This Chapter expressly empowers the Board to
"have general control and supervision" over Montana's public
campuses and "adopt rules for its own government ...that are

proper and necessary for the execution of the powers and duties
conferred upon it by law," and also "rules for the government of
the system" to the extent consistent with Montana's Constitution
and statutes. 279 The Chapter gives the Board powers of general
control of: (1) all System receipts and disbursements; 20 (2) substantial spending and borrowing authority; 2 1 (3) setting student tuition and fees; 28 2 (4) appointing "a president or chancellor and faculty" and "any other necessary officers, agents, and
employees, and fix[ing] their compensation;" 21 (5) power to delegate to Presidents and faculty "authority relating to the immediate control and management" at each System campus, other
than final financial or faculty selection decisions; 2 1 (6) conferring all degrees2' and eliminating needless course duplication;2' and (7) approving all types of contracts for campus research and development activity.287
The only issue that appears to be left unaddressed in Montana statutes is legal standing to sue and be sued. (This is an
explainable omission given the Board's independent constitutional entity status; and this could be easily addressed by statute
similar to the one granting similar legal power to Montana's

279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.

MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 20-25-301(1) to -301(3) (1995).
See MONT. CODE ANN. § 20-25-301(8) (1995).
See MONT. CODE ANN. § 20-25-402 (1995).
See MONT. CODE ANN. § 20-25-421 (1995).
MONT. CODE ANN. § 20-25-301(9) (1995).
MONT. CODE ANN. § 20-25-301(10), (11) (1995).
See MONT. CODE ANN. § 20-25-301(4) (1995).
See MONT. CODE ANN. § 20-25-301(12) (1995).
See MONT. CODE ANN. § 20-25-108 (1995).

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol58/iss2/2

70

Aronofsky: Voters Wisely Reject Proposed Constitutional Amendment

1997]

BOARD OF REGENTS

403

Self-Insurers Guaranty Fund Board).'
Current Code provisions, left substantially intact or readily amended and transferred to a new type of governing board, could meet most or all
accreditation requirements and legitimate policy concerns.
Several other state governance legal models, other than one
based on full constitutional autonomy, appear similar to what
Montana could face if some version of C-30 were ever approved,
at least with regard to governing board authority. Wisconsin,
which has a top quality public university system by any reasonable measurement criteria, achieves this almost solely by a statutory Board of Regents responsible for governing the state's
multiple campuses through general statutory powers provided by
the Legislature, including powers to appoint the System President and all campus chancellors as well as others similar to
Montana's.2" Its sole constitutional language applicable to
campuses states: "Provision shall be made by law for the establishment of a state university... and for connecting with the
same, from time to time, such colleges in different parts of the
state as the interests of education may require."' No board is
even mentioned.
The University of Virginia Board of Visitors, created by
Thomas Jefferson to design and govern a public campus to be
known for academic excellence, likewise derives virtually all
authority from a Virginia General Assembly which statutorily
empowers the Board to appoint a President, define faculty duties, and "generally, in respect to the government and management of the University, make such regulations as they may deem
expedient, not being contrary to law." 1 Virginia's Constitution
merely authorizes legislative creation of public universities, and
provides that "governance of such institutions, and the status
and powers of their boards of visitors or other governing bodies,
shall be as provided by law."'
Oregon's State Board of Higher Education governs all public
universities with no constitutional reference to either the Board
or the campuses. Instead, the Board has statutory authority to

288. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-2611 (1995).
289. See WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 36.09, 36.11 (West 1996).
290. WIS. CONST. art. X, § 6.
291. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-76 (Michie 1996).
292. VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 9. The University of Washington Board of Regents
acts pursuant to almost identical statutory and constitutional language, which names
neither the Board nor the University. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 28B.20.130
(West 1996); WASH. CONST. art. 13, § 1.
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appoint all campus presidents and its own chancellor to oversee
them with broad powers to set all policies, rules and regulations
it deems in the state's best interest.2 93
These and other states' governance models afford Montana
ample opportunity for a viable, healthy public university system
if it chooses. To do so, Montana would need to ensure that any
adoption and implementation of some C-30 variation at the same
time protects the campuses and their governing board from too
much dominance by executive branch agencies and leaves the
present state statutory scheme intact. However, for this to occur
the type of Education Department and Director called for in C-30
would have to be given subservient roles to the governing board
so that the latter could wield actual legal authority on its own.
To avoid making the governing board and state campuses captives of the executive branch, which would soon stifle the significant Montana University System improvements to date, it may
also be necessary to grant legal authority and sufficient funding
for any new governing board to hire its own chief executive officer subject solely to board appointment and removal without
gubernatorial or Education Department control. This is needed
regardless to avoid the legal instability and accreditation problems cited above.
IX.

CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS

In reviewing the C-30 issue and how Montana voters decided, a number of key conclusions can be drawn: First, most United States public higher education systems, campuses and governing boards do not have constitutionally autonomous status, although those which do seem to benefit from better quality education programs, greater fiscal and legal stability, and fewer likely
accreditation problems. More significantly, no state governance
system resembles the one C-30 proposed which permitted university decision-making by a partisan political appointee. This factor alone probably justifies the C-30 defeat, (given the United
States preference for empowering lay governing boards to make
these types of decisions). Second, viable United States public
higher education requires governing boards to be legally independent from legislative and executive agency interference to the

293. See OR. REV. STAT. § 351.060 (West 1996). Moreover, the 1995 Legislature
increased Board autonomy over all purchasing, procurement and contracting of goods
and services to encourage better resource utilization. See id. This is not atypical of
most states' recent increased autonomy for campuses.
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full extent practicable without regard to the specific state legal
model needed to achieve such independence. Board legal autonomy, whether derived from constitutions or statutes, still subjects
public campuses and systems to accountability on all important
matters while protecting them from trivialities which sap quality
at taxpayer expense.
Third, C-30 proponents relied on a 1994 Task Force which
appeared to purposely encourage Montana's return to an education structure that sorely failed the state for many decades. Montana higher education history compels extreme caution when
considering any measure which is capable of steering public
campuses back to the disastrous days before 1972.
Finally, there has never been the necessary analysis of what
the costs or benefits of C-30 would be. The lack of motivating
evidence casts serious doubt about why any change was ever
needed.
It is neither impracticable nor inconsistent with the laws of
most other states to create a viable governance alternative to
Montana's present Board of Regents. However, the obvious lack
of discussion during the C-30 debate about the requirements for
a viable public higher education governance system, its feasibility and effectiveness probably led to the decision by Montana
voters to stay with the status quo. Proponents of any governance
change in Montana must demonstrate how their new system will
not return Montana to the poor conditions present in pre-1972
higher education history. They must also assure Montanans that
any alternative system will result in university quality and an
avoidance of political meddling at least comparable to public
higher education systems in other states. Until those who propose drastic change to the Board of Regents structure present
this information to the voters, Montanans are well-advised to
resist changes as they resoundingly did when Montana voters
defeated C-30 at the polls.
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